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The Legal Ramifications of Christian 
Nationalism 
Steven K. Green* 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the more resilient debates about American 
constitutional history is the one over the nation’s purported 
religious founding.  As predictable as the Chicago Cubs’ collapse 
every summer, legal and religious conservatives periodically raise 
claims about America’s Christian heritage in their efforts to gain 
the moral and legal high ground in the ongoing culture wars.  One 
recent example of this is found in the June 24, 2018, Sunday sermon 
of Reverend Robert Jeffress of First Baptist Church of Dallas, 
Texas.1  In that sermon, titled “America is a Christian Nation,” 
Reverend Jeffress asserted that the nation’s Founders were 
predominately evangelical Christians and that they intended to 
instill Christian values in the nation’s governing documents.2  
America was founded as a Christian nation, Jeffress insisted, and 
the nation’s law and institutions needed to rediscover and reaffirm 
this basis.3 
While Reverend Jeffress’s claims could be passed off as the 
ramblings of a fundamentalist preacher, Dallas First Baptist is 
* Steven K. Green is the Fred H. Paulus Professor of Law and Affiliated
Professor of History and Religious Studies at Willamette University.  In addi-
tion, Professor Green directs the interdisciplinary Center for Religion, Law and 
Democracy, one of Willamette’s Centers of Excellence. 
1. Robert Jeffress, America Is a Christian Nation, FIRST BAPTIST DALLAS
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considered one of the more prestigious congregations in the nation’s 
largest Protestant denomination.4  And Reverend Jeffress is not 
alone in his assertions—he is part of a large group of political and 
religious figures who raise similar truth-claims and use Christian 
nation arguments to promote a conservative social and political 
agenda.5  More than a handful of Christian Nationalists have 
access to the holders of the nation’s political and judicial power; 
Jeffress, for one, was among President Donald Trump’s closest 
religious advisors, serving on his Evangelical Advisory Board.6  
Although claims that America was founded as a Christian nation 
have existed for a long time, ebbing and flowing in response to 
cultural forces,7 the maxim witnessed a resurgence in the latter 
decades of the twentieth century, carrying over into the twenty-first 
century.8  Investigative journalists at Religion Dispatches and 
Church & State magazine have documented the rise in Christian 
nationalism for some time,9 and in 2019 the moderate-leaning 
Baptist Joint Committee for Religious Liberty (BJC) launched an 
initiative to combat this trend, “Christians Against Christian 
Nationalism,” with the BJC’s director declaring that the “threat of 
4. Daniel Silliman, At Jeffress’ First Baptist Church of Dallas, Trump
Support is Part of a 150-Year Tradition, RELIGION DISPATCHES (July 31, 2018), 
https://religiondispatches.org/at-jeffress-first-baptist-church-of-dallas-trump-
support-is-part-of-a-150-year-tradition/ [https://perma.cc/BUD7-NKNE]. 
5. See, e.g., Rob Boston, All the President’s Men and Women: Members Of
Trump’s Evangelical Advisory Board Are Hard at Work Changing Public Policy 




6. See id.; Liz Hayes, The Apostle of Trump: The Rev. Robert Jeffress
Wasn’t Known to Most Americans Before He Emerged As President’s Chief 
Evangelical Defender, CHURCH & STATE MAGAZINE (July/Aug. 2018), 
https://www.au.org/church-state/julyaugust-2018-church-state-magazine/fea-
tured/the-apostle-of-trump-the-rev-robert [https://perma.cc/28NK-5QK5].  
7. See generally STEVEN K. GREEN, INVENTING A CHRISTIAN AMERICA: THE
MYTH OF THE RELIGIOUS FOUNDING (2015). 
8. See Liz Theoharis, The rise of Christian Nationalism in America,
SALON (Oct. 4, 2020), https://www.salon.com/2020/10/04/the-rise-of-christian-
nationalism-in-america-_partner/ [https://perma.cc/JM4W-KUNA]. 
9. See, e.g., Simon Brown, Founded On Faith?, CHURCH & STATE
MAGAZINE (July/Aug. 2015), https://www.au.org/church-state/julyaugust-2015-
church-state/featured/founded-on-faith [perma.cc/27GK-J5QU]; see also Silli-
man, supra note 4. 
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Christian Nationalism has reached [a] high tide.”10  Indeed, some 
scholars have maintained that the election of Donald Trump as 
president in 2016 can be explained in part by Trump’s loaded 
rhetoric that appealed to Christian nationalist voters.11 
Before proceeding further, the proposition that America is a 
Christian nation requires defining, as does the impulse of Christian 
nationalism.  Defining the former is more difficult than it looks, as 
the concept of America being a Christian nation has a protean 
quality.  A high degree of scholarly consensus exists about the 
religious impulses behind the settling of the British-American 
colonies and the significant role that religious rhetoric played 
during the founding period that inspired popular support for the 
revolutionary and republican causes.12  Scholars also generally 
agree that the evangelical revivals of the 1740s spawned nascent 
democratic impulses by emphasizing liberty of conscience and 
turning religious affiliation into a voluntary enterprise.13  There is 
much less agreement over whether there was a direct connection 
between Calvinist-covenantal theology and Biblical principles on 
one side and the sources of republican ideology on the other side.14 
Proceeding further in this taxonomy, a smaller number of scholars 
and popular writers argue that a Protestant ethos pervaded the 
10. Amanda Tyler, Opinion, Threat of Christian Nationalism Has Reached
High Tide, GOOD FAITH MEDIA (July 30, 2019), https://goodfaithme-
dia.org/threat-of-christian-nationalism-has-reached-high-tide/ 
[perma.cc/4LAT-ZBEZ]. 
11. Andrew L. Whitehead, Samuel L. Perry & Joseph O. Baker, Make
America Christian Again: Christian Nationalism & Voting for Donald Trump 
in the 2016 Presidential Election, 73 SOC. RELIGION 147, 153 (2018). 
12. See generally CATHERINE L. ALBANESE, SONS OF THE FATHERS: THE CIVIL
RELIGION OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1976); RUTH H. BLOCH, VISIONARY
REPUBLIC: MILLENNIAL THEMES IN AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1756–1800 (1985); 
NATHAN O. HATCH, THE SACRED CAUSE OF LIBERTY: REPUBLICAN THOUGHT AND
THE MILLENNIUM IN REVOLUTIONARY NEW ENGLAND (1977); THOMAS S. KIDD, 
GOD OF LIBERTY: A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2010); 
MARK A. NOLL, AMERICA’S GOD: FROM JONATHAN EDWARDS TO ABRAHAM
LINCOLN (2002). 
13. See generally CEDRIC B. COWING, THE GREAT AWAKENING AND THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION: COLONIAL THOUGHT IN THE 18TH CENTURY (1971); ALAN
HEIMERT, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN MIND: FROM THE GREAT AWAKENING TO
THE REVOLUTION (1966); FRANK LAMBERT, INVENTING THE “GREAT AWAKENING” 
(1999). 
14. See MARK A. NOLL, NATHAN O. HATCH & GEORGE M. MARSDEN, THE
SEARCH FOR CHRISTIAN AMERICA 70–106 (1983). 
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founding period—rather than a post-Enlightenment one—and that 
the ubiquitous religious rhetoric indicates that: (1) the majority of 
people, including the political leadership, held orthodox-Christian 
beliefs; and (2) that framers of the nation’s governing documents 
intended to incorporate Christian principles into them.15  Finally, 
an even smaller number of writers and politicians claim that the 
United States was specially blessed or chosen by God, that his 
providential hand directed the framers in the nation’s founding.16  
Under this last perspective, the nation’s past and founding 
documents assume an almost sacred quality.  As can be 
appreciated, due to the variety of potential understandings and 
fluidity between perspectives, it can be difficult to decipher what 
one means when speaking of America’s Christian heritage or of it 
being a “Christian nation.”17 
As a result, rhetoric about America’s Christian founding can 
appeal to a wide audience.  Many people hold vague, if not ill-
defined ideas about America’s Christian nationhood.18  A study by 
the First Amendment Center revealed that over fifty percent of 
Americans believe that the U.S. Constitution created a Christian 
nation, notwithstanding its express prohibitions on religious 
establishments and religious tests for public office holding.19  A 
15. See MARK D. HALL, DID AMERICA HAVE A CHRISTIAN FOUNDING? 
SEPARATING MODERN MYTH FROM HISTORICAL TRUTH 23–55 (2019). 
16. See generally GARY DEMAR, AMERICA’S CHRISTIAN HISTORY: THE
UNTOLD STORY (1995); JOHN FEA, WAS AMERICA FOUNDED AS A CHRISTIAN
NATION?: A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION (2011); TIM LAHAYE, FAITH OF OUR 
FOUNDING FATHERS (1987).  In a 2000 study, sociologist Christian Smith iden-
tified six meanings of a “Christian America” among evangelicals, with the more 
common conceptions being that America was founded by people in search of 
religious liberty, that the laws and structures of American government incor-
porated Christian principles, and that the Founders were devout Christians or 
theists who sought God’s will in founding the nation.  CHRISTIAN SMITH, 
CHRISTIAN AMERICA? WHAT EVANGELICALS REALLY WANT 26–37 (2000). 
17. FEA, supra note 16, xiv–xvi.
18. See David Barton, Is America a Christian Nation?, WALL BUILDERS,
https://wallbuilders.com/america-christian-nation/ [perma.cc/R7PJ-RBCD] 
(last visited Mar. 6, 2021). 
19. FREEDOM FORUM INST., STATE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 2008 3 (2008),
https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/
FAC_sofa_2008report.pdf [perma.cc/3J37-HPQ3] (indicating that 63% of 
Americans either strongly or mildly agree that “the nation’s founders intended 
the United States to be a Christian nation,” while 55% either strongly or mildly 
agree that “the U.S. Constitution establishes a Christian nation”). 
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similar study conducted by the Pew Forum on Religion in Public 
Life revealed even higher numbers, noting that “Americans 
overwhelmingly consider the U.S. a Christian nation: Two-in-three 
(67%) characterize the nation this way.”20  Other studies indicate 
that a majority of Americans believe that the nation’s political 
operations should be based on “Judeo-Christian principles,” if the 
nation’s founding principles are not already.21 
Politicians are notorious for playing on these prepossessions 
and, in turn, reinforcing this narrative.  Christian nation rhetoric 
is such low-hanging fruit that many politicians cannot resist 
making at least vague claims.  At times, such rhetoric is used as a 
ceremonial flourish; at other times, the claims are more robust.  
President Ronald Reagan, who was not a devout church-goer, 
despite his support from the evangelical Religious Right, regularly 
alluded to the nation’s providential past, remarking in one speech: 
“[c]an we doubt that only a Divine Providence placed this land, this 
island of freedom, here as a refuge for all those people in the world 
who yearn to breathe free?”22  In a 1984 prayer breakfast he 
declared that “faith and religion play a critical role in the political 
life of our nation,” asserting that the Founders had affirmed this 
relationship in the founding documents: “Those who created our 
country,” Reagan remarked, “understood that there is a divine 
order which transcends the human order.”23  And President George 
W. Bush, a conservative evangelical, frequently revealed his belief
in America’s Christian origins, once affirming that: “[o]ur country
was founded by men and women who realized their dependence on
God and were humbled by His providence and grace.”24  According
to Bush, the Founders did not simply acknowledge their obligation
toward God; they (like Bush) believed that America was specially
20. Many Americans Uneasy with Mix of Religion and Politics, PEW
RESEARCH CTR. (Aug. 24, 2006), https://www.pewforum.org/2006/08/24/many-
americans-uneasy-with-mix-of-religion-and-politics/ [perma.cc/47DA-RWZZ]. 
21. Mariana Servin-Gonzalez & Oscar Torres-Reyna, The Polls-Trends:
Religion and Politics, 63 PUB. OPINION Q. 592, 604 (1999). 
22. RICHARD V. PIERARD & ROBERT D. LINDER, CIVIL RELIGION AND THE 
PRESIDENCY 273–74 (1988). 
23. Ronald Reagan, Politics and Morality are Inseparable, 1 NORTE DAME 
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 7, 7 (1985).
24. President’s Thanksgiving Day Proclamation, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 22,
2007, 12:00 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/presidents-
thanksgiving-day-proclamation/ [perma.cc/4F42-BDVM]. 
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chosen, “not because we consider ourselves a chosen nation” but 
because “God moves and chooses [us] as He wills.”25 
Whether intended or not, such rhetoric has fueled a meaty 
variant of the Christian nation maxim, one that is being pushed by 
a new wave of Christian Nationalists.26  In books, articles, and 
reports, they document the extensive use of religious discourse 
during the founding period and the various public affirmations of 
God and religion—such as Thanksgiving day proclamations—to  
construct a conclusive narrative about America’s religious 
origins.27  As one author wrote: “[t]he history of America’s laws, its 
constitutional system, the reason for the American Revolution, or 
the basis of its guiding political philosophy cannot accurately be 
discussed without reference to its biblical roots.”28 
Not only do Christian Nationalists promote the meatier 
versions of the maxim, they seek to move beyond the symbolic to 
“return” the nation and its policies to its Christian roots.29  They 
argue that scholars, judges, and the liberal elite have censored 
America’s Christian past in a conspiracy to install a regime of 
secularism.30  The absence of this narrative from public school and 
25. President Bush’s Second Inaugural Address, NPR (Jan. 20, 2005),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4460172 
[https://perma.cc/P77K-BHCQ]; see also RICHARD T. HUGHES, CHRISTIAN
AMERICA AND THE KINGDOM OF GOD 157–70 (2009) (detailing the relationship 
between President George W. Bush and conservative religious voters). 
26. See, e.g., ANDREW L. SEIDEL, THE FOUNDING MYTH: WHY CHRISTIAN
NATIONALISM IS UN-AMERICAN 8–12 (2019); KATHERINE STEWART, THE POWER 
WORSHIPPERS: INSIDE THE DANGEROUS RISE OF RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM (2020); 
ANDREW L. WHITEHEAD & SAMUEL L. PERRY, TAKING AMERICA BACK FOR GOD: 
CHRISTIAN NATIONALISM IN THE UNITED STATES passim (2020). 
27. See generally GARY T. AMOS, DEFENDING THE DECLARATION: HOW THE 
BIBLE AND CHRISTIANITY INFLUENCED THE WRITING OF THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE (1989); DAVID BARTON, ORIGINAL INTENT: THE COURTS, THE
CONSTITUTION, & RELIGION (5th ed. 2011); DAVID BARTON, SEPARATION OF
CHURCH & STATE: WHAT THE FOUNDERS MEANT (2007); DAVID BARTON, 
AMERICA’S GODLY HERITAGE (1993); DAVID BARTON, THE MYTH OF SEPARATION: 
WHAT IS THE CORRECT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE? (1992) 
[hereinafter MYTH OF SEPARATION]; DEMAR, supra note 16; JOHN EIDSMOE, 
CHRISTIANITY AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE FAITH OF OUR FOUNDING FATHERS 
(1987); JOHN W. WHITEHEAD, THE SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1982). 
28. BENJAMIN HART, FAITH & FREEDOM: THE CHRISTIAN ROOTS OF AMERICAN
LIBERTY 19 (1988). 
29. See WHITEHEAD & PERRY, supra note 26, at 55–119.
30. See GREEN, supra note 7, at 5.
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college history texts reveals a bias against the Christian 
perspective; as one author wrote: “[t]he removal of religion as 
history from our schoolbooks betrays the intellectual dishonesty of 
secular humanist educators and reveals their blind hostility to 
Christianity.”31  It is nothing less than the “deliberate rape of 
history.”32  As a scholar sums up this phenomenon: 
The number of contemporary authors on the quest for a 
Christian America is legion.  The Christian America 
concept moves beyond a simple and fundamental 
acknowledgement of Christianity’s significance in 
American history to a belief that the United States was 
established as a decidedly Christian nation.  Driven by the 
belief that separation of church and state is a myth foisted 
upon the American people by secular courts and scholars, 
defenders of Christian America historiography claim they 
are merely recovering accurate American history from 
revisionist historians conspiring to expunge any remnant 
of Christianity from America’s past.33 
This narrative, when communicated to sympathetic listeners, 
usually calls for a response.  Increasingly, its promoters have urged 
the integration of a Christian nation perspective into law and 
policy.34  One example was a 2007 resolution in the United States 
House of Representatives that called for “[a]ffirming the rich 
spiritual and religious history of our Nation’s founding and 
subsequent history and expressing support for designation of the 
first week in May as ‘American Religious History Week’ for the 
appreciation of and education on America’s history of religious 
faith.”35  Beginning in 2010, the Texas State Board of Education—
a partisan elected entity controlled by Republicans—undertook to 
rewrite the state’s social science curriculum to reflect aspects of a 
31. See LAHAYE, supra note 16, at 2.
32. Id. at 5.
33. Stephen M. Stookey, In God We Trust?  Evangelical Historiography
and the Quest for a Christian America, 41 SW. J. OF THEOLOGY 41, 42 (1999). 
34. See H.R. Res. 888, 110th Cong. (2007), https://www.congress.gov/bill/
110th-congress/house-resolution/888/text [https://perma.cc/TW5M-GHZ3]. 
35. Id. (the resolution stalled in committee).
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Christian nationalist approach.36  More recently, the Congressional 
Prayer Caucus Foundation—an organization with ties to several 
Christian right groups—instituted a massive legislative agenda 
(“Project Blitz”) to encourage state legislatures to enact laws that 
promote “Our Country’s Religious Heritage” in public schools and 
in other public settings.37 
So long as claims about the Christian founding of the nation’s 
political institutions remain in the rhetorical realm, there is less 
cause for concern, at least constitutionally.  But, as this Article 
explores, Christian nation rhetoric has long influenced judicial 
decision-making, and variants of the maxim impact current 
Supreme Court church-state jurisprudence.  This Article explores 
the legal ramifications of the Christian nation maxim and how it 
has affected outcomes in church-state cases in subtle, but also 
significant ways.  This Article also explores how in the process the 
Court has used, and misused, the historical record to reach many of 
its conclusions about church-state matters. 
I. INVENTING A CHRISTIAN AMERICA
A paradox arises when considering whether America is 
Christian in a legal or constitutional sense, such that the nation’s 
laws and policies should reflect and reinforce a Christian 
perspective.  What this means in conventional terms is that 
legislatures would (and should) be able to enact legislation that 
promotes Christian values and that the Constitution’s 
Establishment Clause would be interpreted in such a way as to 
accommodate, if not protect, such policies (presumably, the Free 
Exercise Clause would also be reinterpreted to remove any 
prohibition on religious favoritism of Christianity or on disfavoring 
non-Christian traditions in the receipt of benefits).   
36. See Mark A. Chancey, Rewriting History for a Christian America: Re-
ligion and the Texas Social Studies Controversy of 2009–2010, 94 J. OF
RELIGION 325, 325 (2014); see also Russell Shorto, How Christian Were the 
Founders?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2010), https://www.ny-
times.com/2010/02/14/magazine/14texbooks-t.html [https://perma.cc/2RUL-
492M]. 
37. See WHITEHEAD & PERRY, supra note 26, at 159; see also Frederick
Clarkson, Ringing in a Christian Nationalist 2019 With an Even Larger Legis-
lative Playbook, RELIGION DISPATCHES (Dec. 18, 2018), https://religiondis-
patches.org/ringing-in-a-christian-nationalist-2019-with-an-even-larger-legis-
lative-playbook/ [perma.cc/T52C-DWXJ]. 
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The reason a paradox exists is that notwithstanding the 
presence of religious discourse during the founding period, 
including affirmations of God’s providential hand in the nation’s 
creation, the nation’s core founding documents are bereft of 
references to religious principles or affirmations of God’s authority 
for republican governance.38  To be sure, the Articles of 
Confederation conclude with an assertion that uniting the states 
under one government “pleased the Great Governor of the World,” 
but that reference is hortatory, containing no claim that the 
authority for government comes from God.39  Similarly, the 
Declaration of Independence contains four references to or 
affirmations of a deity, but these references are in Enlightenment 
natural law terms—“Nature’s God,” “Creator,” “Supreme Judge of 
the world,” and “divine Providence.”40  No doubt, Thomas 
Jefferson—who included only the first two terms in his draft41—
appreciated the power of religious allusions, particularly during a 
time of war, and understood that these deific references would 
appeal to rationalists and orthodox Christians alike.  But these 
deific affirmations, couched in Enlightenment terms, do not support 
a Christian basis for the Declaration, republicanism, or the new 
government.  On the contrary, the Declaration is clear that the 
authority for rebellion, independence, and the confederation of 
states rested on “self-evident” truths and the “consent of the 
governed,” not on some higher source.42 
In contrast to those hortatory declarations, the Constitution is 
bereft of even a passing nod to God.43  Authority to establish the 
38. See Jared A. Goldstein, How the Constitution Became Christian, 68
HASTINGS L.J. 259, 267 (2017); see also Is America a Christian Nation?, AM. 
UNITED, https://www.au.org/resources/publications/is-america-a-christian-na-
tion [https://perma.cc/24U8-66N6] (last visited Mar. 6, 2021). 
39. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1777, LIBRARY OF CONG.,
https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/uscode/uscode1952-00100/us-
code1952-001000005/uscode1952-001000005.pdf [https://perma.cc/88Y2-
AM8D] (last visited Mar. 6, 2021). 
40. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776), NAT’L ARCHIVES,
https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/declaration-transcript 
[perma.cc/FA37-HV3X] (last visited Mar. 6, 2021). 
41. See 1 THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1760–
1776, 243–47 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950). 
42. See GREEN, supra note 7, at 163–73.
43. See Goldstein, supra note 38, at 267.
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new United States is derived from “We, the people.”44  The absence 
of an affirmation of God, even one in Enlightenment terms, is 
remarkable considering that the majority of contemporary state 
constitutions contained deistic affirmations.45  So, in that context, 
the omission is significant.  This does not mean that the drafters 
intended to create a “Godless Constitution” in the sense of it being 
an antireligious or irreligious document, but one can fairly infer 
that the omission was purposeful, considering the prevailing 
practice with state constitutions, such that the drafters intended to 
place the authority for republican government on human will.46   
The omission did not go unnoticed.  In fact, two of the more 
contentious points about the Constitution that Anti-Federalists 
raised during the ratification debates were that the Constitution 
lacked a deific affirmation and that it banned any religious 
prerequisite for public office-holding, the latter also being common 
in state constitutions.47  Speaking for many Anti-Federalists, the 
Virginia Independent Chronicle declared that these two reinforcing 
aspects to the Constitution revealed a “cold indifference towards 
religion.”48  As a remedy, one delegate to the Connecticut ratifying 
convention called for adding “an explicit acknowledgement of the 
being of a God, [of] his perfections and his providence” in the 
Constitution.49  And an essayist in the Boston Independent 
Chronicle charged that “all religion is expressly rejected[ ] from the 
Constitution.  Was there ever any State or kingdom that should 
subsist without adopting some system of religion?”50  The answer, 
44. See U.S. CONST. pmbl.
45. See Allan W. Vestal, The Lingering Bigotry of State Constitution Reli-
gious Tests, 15 U. MD. L.J. OF RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 55, 56 (2015). 
46. ISAAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION: 
THE CASE AGAINST RELIGIOUS CORRECTNESS 24–45 (1996). 
47. See GREEN, supra note 7, at 183.
48. A Proposal for Reviving Christian Conviction, VA. INDEP. CHRON., Oct.
31, 1787, reprinted in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 125, 126–27 (Herbert 
J. Storing ed., 1981).
49. Letter of William Williams, AM. MERCURY, Feb. 11, 1788, reprinted in
ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES PUBLISHED DURING ITS
DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787–1788, 207, 207 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 
1892). 
50. Essay by Samuel, INDEP. CHRON. & UNIVERSAL ADVERTISER (Boston),
Jan. 10, 1788, reprinted in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 191, 195 (Herbert 
J. Storing ed., 1981).
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so far as it concerned the Constitution, was apparently “yes.” 
Scholars have generally agreed that the ideological sources for 
ideas about republican governance came from classical models (i.e., 
the Greek and Roman republics), the common law, Enlightenment 
theorists (John Locke, Baron Montesquieu, etc.), and Whig writers, 
not from Christianity.51 
Contemporaries acknowledged the irreligious character of the 
Constitution, or at least that its authority came from the people, 
rather than from a higher source.  Even orthodox clergy who were 
prone to making providential claims, agreed about the nation’s 
secular foundations.  Speaking in a 1791 Fourth of July sermon, 
Presbyterian minister William Linn advanced a popular Calvinist 
narrative of analogizing the union of states to the tribes of Old 
Testament Israel as a way of declaring the nation’s chosen status.52  
At the same time, however, Linn acknowledged that constitutional 
authority was based on the “representation of the people from 
whom all legitimate government is derived.”53  He contrasted the 
new republican government with “[the] government which Jesus 
Christ hath instituted in his Church [which] is distinct from the 
power which appertains to the kingdoms of this world.”54  Several 
years later, as the nation became embroiled in financial crisis and 
international intrigue, the absence of a religious foundation for the 
government became a cause for concern.55  Presbyterian minister 
51. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 22–54 (1967). 
52. See WILLIAM LINN, THE BLESSINGS OF AMERICA 9 (1791); see also ENOS
HITCHCOCK, AN ORATION IN COMMEMORATION OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1793), reprinted in 2 POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE 
AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA, 1730–1805, 1171, 1173-83 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 2d ed. 
1998) (extolling the virtues of the United States’ republican government as the 
progeny of great civilizations, but surpassing their limitations); JOHN THAYER, 
A DISCOURSE DELIVERED AT THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH IN BOSTON (1798), 
reprinted in 2 POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA, supra, at 
1341, 1343–61 (urging the listeners to respect the government as established 
in the United States Constitution and cautioning them against insubordina-
tion lest they follow in the footsteps of revolutionary France, with its deleteri-
ous effects on religious institutions). 
53. LINN, supra note 52, at 17.
54. Id. at 19.
55. See 3 JOHN M. MASON, Divine Judgments, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF
JOHN M. MASON 39, 53 (Ebenezer Mason ed., 1852). 
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John Mason bemoaned that while the nation had received God’s 
blessings:  
[T]hat very [C]onstitution which the singular goodness of
God enabled us to establish, does not so much as recognize
his being! . . . [F]rom the constitution of the United States,
it is impossible to ascertain what God we worship; or
whether we own a God at all. . . .  Should the citizens of
America be as irreligious as her constitution, we will have
reason to tremble lest the Governor of the universe . . .
crush us to atoms.56
This lament about the irreligious nature of the government 
continued into the 1800 presidential election where orthodox clergy 
charged that Thomas Jefferson’s election would perpetuate a “civil 
society as founded in Atheism.”57  John Mason again raised the 
charge that the “Federal Constitution makes no acknowledgement 
of that God who gave us our national existence.”58  In “the pride of 
our citizenship,” Mason declared, the Founders had “forgotten our 
Christianity.”59 
If members of the founding generation largely agreed that the 
nation’s governing documents were based on secular, rational 
principles, then how did the narrative arise about the nation’s 
Christian origins?  Several events came together in the early 
nineteenth century to support the belief that America was founded 
as a Christian nation.  The first event that fueled a reevaluation of 
the nation’s founding was the extensive growth in evangelical 
Protestantism in the early 1800s, fueled by a proliferation of 
revivals, commonly called the Second Great Awakening.60  This 
expansion of an evangelical perspective coincided with a general 
discrediting of deistic and rationalist thought as a result of popular 
revulsion of the excesses of the French Revolution.61  In addition to 
seeking reaffirmations of piety in the public realm, evangelicals 
shared an eschatology (post-millennialism) that taught that Jesus’ 
56. Id. (emphasis in original).
57. 4 JOHN M. MASON, Voice of Warning, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF JOHN 
M. MASON 533, 552 (Ebenezer Mason ed., 1852).
58. Id. at 570.
59. Id. at 561; see also GREEN, supra note 7, at 190–98.
60. See GREEN, supra note 7, at 201.
61. See id. at 211–12.
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second coming would occur after a thousand-year reign of a godly 
society brought about by Christians.62  Evangelicals dusted off 
Puritan motifs of America being specially chosen by God to be an 
exemplar to the world.63  The belief that God’s kingdom would 
become manifest in America necessitated a reconsideration of the 
nation’s founding, which evangelical leaders quickly set out to 
sanctify.64  By the 1820s, evangelical authors were making claims 
about how God had directed the Founders in their political 
endeavors.  Evangelical reformer Lyman Beecher declared in the 
1820s that “our own republic, in its constitution and laws, is of 
heavenly origin.  It was not borrowed from Greece or Rome, but 
from the Bible.”65  Similarly, Reverend Jasper Adams, nephew and 
cousin to presidents, published a sermon in 1833 that asserted that 
the United States had sprung from the efforts of “our strong and 
pious forefathers, in the exercise of a strong and vigorous faith.”66  
The Christian religion “was intended by them to be the corner stone 
of the social and political structures which they were founding.”67  
These “powerful Christian explanations” about the foundations of 
republican government reinforced people’s beliefs about America’s 
exceptionalism, and before long they became the accepted 
narrative.68 
A related event coincided with the growth of evangelicalism 
and fueled its efforts to sanctify the founding.  During the early 
nineteenth century, revisionist histories began to appear that 
offered hagiographic accounts of the American Revolution, its 
leaders, and the drafting of the nation’s governing documents.69  
This movement began almost immediately upon the death of 
George Washington in 1799, where the first president was not only 
venerated but turned into a deific figure.70  This second generation 
62. Id. at 213.
63. See id.
64. Id. at 211–19.
65. Id. at 215 (quoting 1 LYMAN BEECHER, BEECHER’S WORKS 189 (1852)).
66. Id. at 217 (quoting JASPER ADAMS, THE RELATION OF CHRISTIANITY TO
CIVIL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (2d ed. 1833)). 
67. Id. (quoting ADAMS, supra note 66, at 9).
68. Id. at 215 (quoting JON BUTLER, AWASH IN A SEA OF FAITH: 
CHRISTIANIZING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 212 (1990)). 
69. See id. at 205–10.
70. See id. at 205.
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of historians set out to glorify the founding and provide 
explanations for how the thirteen colonies could defeat the most 
powerful nation on earth.  Washington became the American Moses 
who benefitted from the interposing of God’s providential hand.71  
“Divine Providence gave [Washington] opportunities and 
dispositions to add great acquired, to the greatest of natural 
abilities,” proclaimed Reverend Henry Holcomb; his record of 
leadership “was evidence of the disposals of an all superintending 
Providence.”72  These same biographers and historians turned the 
deist-leaning Washington into an evangelical Christian.73  The 
sanctification of Washington then served to sanctify those events 
and actions in which he had directly participated, including the 
drafting of the Constitution.  By the second and third generations, 
Washington became “irrevocably linked to the Constitution,” 
Catherine Albanese writes, such that his Christian character 
infused the document and influenced his fellow drafters to ground 
American government on religious principles.74  As religious 
historian Robert Baird wrote in 1844: “Most certainly, the 
convention which framed the [C]onstitution in 1787, under the 
presidency of the immortal Washington, was of neither an infidel 
nor atheistical character . . . .  All the leading men in it were 
believers in Christianity, and Washington, as all the world knows, 
was a Christian.”75  This narrative only grew in later years. 
Writing two decades later, revisionist historian Benjamin Morris 
declared that “[m]ost of the statesmen themselves were Christian 
men; and the convention had for its president George Washington, 
who everywhere paid a public homage to the Christian religion.”76  
Further, “[t]he Christian faith and character of the men who formed 
the Constitution forbid the idea that they designed not to place the 
71. See id.
72. Id. at 205–06.
73. Id. at 205–10; see HENRY HOLCOMB, A SERMON OCCASIONED BY THE 
DEATH OF WASHINGTON (1800), reprinted in 2 POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE 
AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA, supra note 52, at 1397, 1405–06. 
74. GREEN, supra note 7, at 209 (quoting CATHERINE L. ALBANESE, SONS OF
THE FATHERS 164-65 (1976)). 
75. Id. (quoting ROBERT BAIRD, RELIGION IN THE UNITED STATES 259–60
(1844)). 
76. B. F. MORRIS, CHRISTIAN LIFE AND CHARACTER OF THE CIVIL
INSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 249 (1864). 
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Constitution and its government under the providence and 
protection of God and the principles of the Christian religion.”77  As 
a result, Morris concluded, “the Constitution was formed under 
Christian influences and is, in its purposes and spirit, a Christian 
instrument.”78  By the mid-century, this narrative of the nation’s 
Christian origins was firmly embedded in popular literature, school 
textbooks, and the public imagination.  There it would remain for 
much of the century. 
II. CHRISTIAN NATIONALISM AS A LEGAL PRINCIPLE
The idea that Christian principles underlay and informed the 
law predates the early nineteenth century rise of Christian nation 
revisionism.  This notion originated from two interrelated concepts: 
first, that the authority for law is derived from a “higher” or “divine” 
law; and second, that Christian principles were incorporated into 
the common law.79  Higher law notions (sometimes referred to as 
natural law) date back to ancient times (e.g., Cicero) and were 
ingrained into the Western legal tradition thanks to medieval 
theorists such as Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274).80  Early British 
legal writers such as Henry de Bracton (1210–1268) integrated 
higher law theory into the emergent common law, which became 
more established in the law thanks to later legal writers including 
Christopher St. Germain and Sir Edward Coke.81  St. Germain 
wrote in the 1530s that the law of England was “based squarely on 
the law of God: ‘law eternal is called the first law,’ he wrote, ‘for it 
was before all other laws, and all other laws be derived from it.’”82 
Coke, Lord Chief Justice under King James I, promoted the “idea 
that divine principles underlay the law by writing in Calvin’s Case 
(1610) that the ‘law of nature is that which God at the time of 
creation of the nature of man infused into his heart (which is also 
77. Id.
78. Id. at 248–49.
79. See STEVEN K. GREEN, THE SECOND DISESTABLISHMENT: CHURCH AND
STATE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 149–50 (2010). 
80. CORNELIA GREER LEBOUTILLIER, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND NATURAL
LAW 59–68 (1950); id. at 150–51. 
81. See GREEN, supra note 79, at 151.
82. Id. (quoting CHRISTOPHER ST. GERMAIN, THE DOCTOR AND STUDENT 3,
10 (1874)). 
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the moral law).’”83  “This natural/higher law, Coke asserted, was 
prior and superior to ‘any judicial or municipal law in the world,’ 
‘immutable,’ and ‘part of the laws of England.’”84  Finally, William 
Blackstone also promoted the idea of a preeminent higher law, 
writing in his Commentaries that “natural law was ‘dictated by God 
himself’ and was ‘of course superior in obligation to any other 
[law].’”85  Coke and Blackstone were highly influential for early 
American lawyers, with the latter’s Commentaries selling over 1500 
copies in the American colonies at the cusp of the American 
Revolution.86 
The second idea was a variant of higher law theorems: that 
Christian doctrines were expressly incorporated into the common 
law.87  This maxim arose in part due to the legal status and official 
recognition of the Church of England, which, in addition to having 
its own ecclesiastical law, received support from the common law.88  
Sir Henry Finch’s 1627 treatise, Law or a Discourse Thereof, 
popularized the maxim that “Christianity formed part of the 
common law by claiming that all types of law (including the 
common law) were founded on ‘holy scripture.’”89  British courts 
quickly put meaning on the maxim by relying on it to uphold 
criminal prosecutions for blasphemy.90  In one famous case, Lord 
Matthew Hale asserted that a defendant’s blasphemy “not only 
offended God and the Christian religion but also subverted the laws 
and government itself.”91  “Christianity is parcel of the laws of 
England,” Hale wrote, so “to reproach the Christian Religion is to 
83. Id. at 151–52 (quoting Calvin’s Case, 7 Co. 4b, 12a-12b (1610)).
84. Id. at 152 (quoting Calvin’s Case, 7 Co. at 12a-12b).
85. See id. at 153–54 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON 
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 40–42 (Stanley N. Katz ed., Univ. of Chi. Press 1979) 
(1765)). 
86. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 88–89 (1973).
87. See GREEN, supra note 79, at 154-55.
88. See Bradley S. Chilton, Cliobernetics, Christianity, and the Common
Law, 83 LAW LIBR. J. 355, 356 (1991). 
89. GREEN, supra note 79, at 152; Chilton, supra note 88, at 358, 361–62.
90. Chilton, supra note 88, at 358–59; see GREEN, supra note 79, at 152–
53. 
91. GREEN, supra note 79, at 152.
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speak Subversion of the Law.”92  Later blasphemy cases reaffirmed 
that principle.93  William Blackstone promoted the maxim too, 
asserting that “blasphemy, as well as other offenses against God 
and religion, were punishable at common law by fine and 
imprisonment because ‘Christianity is part of the laws of 
England.’”94   
These complimentary notions, embedded in the British legal 
tradition by the eighteenth century, became part of the common law 
of colonial and early national America.  Many early American 
lawyers likely considered both notions to be chiefly theoretical 
propositions, but a handful of leading jurists promoted both 
concepts and argued for their practical applications.95  James 
Wilson was a leading member of the Constitutional Convention, a 
law professor at the College of Philadelphia, and Associate Justice 
of the U.S. Supreme Court.96  In his published law lectures, Wilson 
asserted that there was a higher law comprised of those “general 
and fixed rules” that the “great Creator of all things has 
established.”97  Natural law, too, “flow[ed] from the same divine 
source . . . the law of God,” though he insisted that municipal law 
and the “law of nations—those areas that ‘form[ ] the objects of the 
profession of law’—were governed chiefly by reason, conscience, and 
custom.”98  Going a step farther than Wilson, “Maryland law 
professor David Hoffman wrote in 1823 that even municipal law 
had its ‘deep foundations in the universal laws of our moral nature, 
92. Id. (quoting Rex v. Taylor, 1 Vent. 293; 3 Keble 607, 621 (1676)); see
LEONARD W. LEVY, TREASON AGAINST GOD: A HISTORY OF THE OFFENSE OF 
BLASPHEMY 313–14 (1981).  Taylor reputedly declared Christ to be a “whore-
master” and a “bastard” and religion to be a “cheat.”  Id. at 418 n.9 (quoting 
Taylor, 3 Keble at 621).  Taylor also claimed to be the younger brother of Jesus. 
Id.  In another blasphemy case 53 year later, Chief Justice Raymond would 
write that “Christianity in general is parcel of the common law of England and 
therefore to be protected by it.”  Rex v. Woolston, 2 Strange’s Rpts., 832, 834; 1 
Barn. 162 (K.B. 1729); 94 Eng. Rep. 112. 
93. See GREEN, supra note 79, at 152–53.
94. Id. at 153 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
LAWS OF ENGLAND 55 (Charles M. Harr ed., Beacon Press 1962) (1765–1769)). 
95. See id. at 155–56.
96. Id. at 156.
97. Id. (quoting 1 JAMES WILSON, THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 123–26
(Robert G. McClosky ed., 1967)). 
98. Id. (quoting WILSON, supra note 97, at 123–26).
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and, all its positive enactments, proceeding on these, must receive 
their just interpretation with a reference to them.’”99  “Hoffman 
identified the Bible as the first and preeminent foundation of the 
law: it was ‘the foundation of the common law in every [C]hristian 
nation. . . .  There is much law in it.’”100  As a result, “‘[t]he 
[C]hristian religion is a part of the law of the land,’ Hoffman
asserted, and ‘should certainly receive no inconsiderable portion of
the lawyer’s attention.’”101
The two most notable proponents of a higher law theorem and 
for the incorporation of Christian principles into American law were 
New York Chancellor James Kent and United States Supreme 
Court Justice Joseph Story.  “Both Kent and Story had trained on 
Coke and Blackstone and had a deep affection for the common 
law,”102 and their writings were highly influential on generations 
of American lawyers.103  In his influential Commentaries on 
American Law, Kent sprinkled higher law concepts liberally 
throughout its discussions.104  Kent asserted that positive law could 
not be separated entirely from “natural jurisprudence . . . from 
which the science of morality is deduced.”105  The law of nations, 
Kent continued, “so far as it is founded on the principles of natural 
law, is equally binding in every age, and upon all mankind.”106  But 
“the Christian nations” were governed by “a brighter light, [with] 
more certain truths . . . which Christianity has communicated to 
the ethical jurisprudence of the ancients, hav[ing] established a law 
of nations peculiar to themselves.”107   
99. Id. at 157 (1 DAVID HOFFMAN, A LECTURE, INTRODUCTORY TO A COURSE 
OF LEGAL STUDY 64–66 (1823)). 
100. Id. (quoting HOFFMAN, supra note 99, at 64–66).
101. Id. (quoting HOFFMAN, supra note 99, at 64–66).
102. Id.
103. See generally Symposium, The Influence of Story and Kent on the De-
velopment of the Common Law, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 221 (1973). 
104. See GREEN, supra note 79, at 157.
105. See id. at 157–58 (quoting 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN
LAW 2–3 (Little, Brown & Co. 13th ed. 1884) (1826)). 
106. 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 4 (O.W. Holmes, Jr.
ed., Little, Brown & Co. 12th ed. 1878) (1826). 
107. Id.; GREEN, supra note 79, at 419 n.26 (quoting KENT, supra note 106,
at 2–4). 
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Story, a close friend of Kent, also emphasized a higher law 
source to natural law in several of his speeches and writings.108  
“Story stressed that natural law lay ‘at the foundation of all other 
laws’” and was a requisite “for understanding of all aspects of 
jurisprudence, especially constitutional law and the common 
law.”109  For Story, natural law had an unmistakable theistic 
quality: 
The obligatory force of the law of nature upon man is de-
rived from its presumed coincidence with the will of the 
Creator.  God has fashioned man according to his own 
pleasures, and has fixed the laws of his being . . . .  He has 
the supreme right to prescribe the rules, to which man 
shall regulate his conduct, and the means, by which he 
shall obtain happiness and avoid misery.110 
Story asserted that “as [God] is our Lawgiver and Judge, we 
owe an unreserved obedience to his commands.”111  This fealty was 
equally required of public officials: “[a]ll magistrates are 
responsible to God for the due and honest discharge of their 
duty.”112 
Story’s and Kent’s acceptance of a higher basis for the law led 
them to embrace the maxim that Christian principles were 
incorporated into the law itself.  Story wrote about the maxim more 
frequently than Kent, though the latter famously put the maxim 
into practice.  In 1829, Story delivered his inaugural address as the 
Dane Professor of Law at Harvard Law School.113  Five years 
earlier, a letter of Thomas Jefferson’s had been publicized where 
the former president had decried the idea of the law’s incorporation 
of Christianity as a “judiciary forgery,” based on “a conspiracy . . . 
between Church and State.”114  Upon hearing about Jefferson’s 
108. GREEN, supra note 79, at 158.
109. Id. (quoting JOSEPH STORY, The Value and Importance of Legal Study
(Aug. 25, 1829), in MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 503, 533 (Wil-
liam W. Story ed., 1852)). 
110. Id. (quoting Joseph Story, Natural Law, in 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA 
AMERICANA 150, 150 (Francis Leiber ed., 1836)). 
111. Id. (quoting Story, supra note 110, at 151).
112. Id. (quoting Story, supra note 110, at 158).
113. STORY, supra note 109, at 503.
114. GREEN, supra note 79, at 193 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
John Cartwright (June 5, 1824), in 16 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 42, 
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letter, Story wrote a friend that “[i]t appears to me inconceivable 
how any man can doubt, that Christianity is part of the Common 
Law of England.”115  But Story waited until Jefferson’s death to 
attack him publicly, which he did in his Harvard lecture:   
One of the most beautiful boasts of our municipal 
jurisprudence is, that Christianity is a part of the common 
law, from which it seeks to sanction its rights, and by which 
it endeavors to regulate its doctrines.  And 
notwithstanding the specious objection of one of our 
distinguished statesmen, the boast is as true as it is 
beautiful.  There has never been a period in which the 
common law did not recognize Christianity as lying at its 
foundations.116 
For Story, this meant that the United States was “a part of the 
Christian community of nations,” which acquired their authority 
for their “policy of laws” through their consistency with Christian 
precepts.117  Story followed up on his brief retort to Jefferson with 
a more comprehensive rebuttal in an 1833 article in The American 
Jurist titled Christianity a Part of the Common Law.118  Story 
refuted Jefferson’s historical analysis (calling it “novel”) with an 
extensive review of British authority that had affirmed the 
maxim.119  He noted several areas of the law—domestic, behavioral, 
criminal—that drew on Christian values for their meaning.120  “But 
50–51 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Allery Bergh eds., 1903)).  Jefferson had 
long held similar sentiments, writing in an earlier essay in the appendix to his 
Reports of Cases Determined in the General Court of Virginia of “judicial for-
gery” underpinned by an “alliance between church and state in England [which 
had] made their judges accomplices in the frauds of the clergy.”  1 THOMAS
JEFFERSON, Whether Christianity is Part of the Common Law? (1764), reprinted 
in THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 360, 360 n.1, 367 (Paul Leicester Ford 
ed., 1892).  Jefferson’s citation of Blackstone’s Commentaries, published in 
1769, however, makes 1764 too early for the essay’s publication.  GREEN, supra 
note 79, at 424 n.65. 
115. Letter from Joseph Story to Edward Everett (Sept. 15, 1824), in LIFE
AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY, 429, 429–30 (Williams W. Story ed., 1851). 
116. STORY, supra note 109, at 517.
117. Id. at 534–35.
118. See Joseph Story, Christianity a Part of the Common Law, 9 AM. JURIST
& L. MAG. 346, 346–48 (1833). 
119. Id.
120. See id. at 347.
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independently of any weight in any of these authorities,” Story 
declared, “can any man seriously doubt, that Christianity is 
recognized as true, as a revelation, by the law of England, that is, 
by the common law?”121   
Story demonstrated the practical application of the maxim in 
an 1827 decision while riding circuit as a trial judge.  During one 
trial, the defendant’s counsel moved to exclude the testimony of two 
witnesses on the ground they were Universalists and did not believe 
in God or in a future state of punishments and rewards, which 
rendered them unable to swear an oath.122  Story agreed, ruling 
that the witnesses’ lack of religious belief rendered them 
incompetent to testify.123  “Persons who do not believe in the 
existence of God or a future state, or have no religious belief, are 
not entitled to be sworn as witnesses,” Story wrote, applying the 
traditional common law rule.124  Although Story did not elaborate 
on the basis for his holding, he noted in his Harvard speech that a 
religious prerequisite for swearing an oath was one example of how 
the law incorporated Christian principles.125   
Another case in which the maxim came up was the famous 1844 
case of Vidal v. Girard’s Executor, involving a two-million-dollar 
bequest to establish a college in Philadelphia, but only on the 
condition that the institution be nonsectarian in the sense that no 
religious tenets be taught.126  Daniel Webster represented those 
relatives of the testator who sought to have the gift nullified as 
“derogatory to the Christian religion.”127  Before the Supreme 
Court, Webster argued that the bequest was void because it 
conflicted with the principle that Christianity was part of the 
law.128  Because “Christian religion, its general principles, must 
ever be regarded among us as the foundation of civil society,” 
121. Id. at 348 (emphasis in original).




125. STORY, supra note 109, at 517.
126. Vidal v. Girard’s Executor, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127, 130, 133 (1844).
127. DANIEL WEBSTER, The Christian Ministry and the Religious Instruc-
tion of the Young (Feb. 20, 1844), in THE SPEECHES AND ORATIONS OF DANIEL
WEBSTER 505, 505, 508 (Edwin P. Whipple ed., 1906). 
128. Id. at 508–30.
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Webster argued, “the preservation of Christianity is one of the great 
and leading ends of government.”129  Webster cited to areas of the 
law such as prohibitions on blasphemy and Sunday labor to 
demonstrate how the law reinforced Christianity.130  All of these 
examples, Webster insisted, “proclaim that Christianity, general, 
tolerant Christianity . . . is the law of the land.”131  Webster’s 
argument was no doubt directed at Justice Story, who told his wife 
that “the whole discussion ha[d] assumed a semi-theological 
character.”132   
Writing the opinion in Vidal for the Court, Story upheld the 
bequest, reading the will’s language narrowly so as to prohibit 
sectarian instruction only, such that lay teachers could still instruct 
in “the general principles of Christianity.”133  Meeting Webster’s 
argument half-way, Story declared: 
[W]e are compelled to admit that although Christianity be
a part of the common law of the state, yet it is so in this
qualified sense, that its divine origin and truth are
admitted, and therefore it is not to be maliciously and
openly reviled and blasphemed against, to the annoyance
of believers or the injury of the public.134
Story did not address Webster’s claims that Christianity served as 
the foundation for government other than calling the United States 
a “Christian country;” rather, he simply noted that the justices were 
satisfied that “there is nothing in the devise establishing a college 
. . . which [is] inconsistent with the Christian religion.”135  
Although Story read the language of the bequest generously, his 
opinion suggested that a clearer irreligious bequest might still be 
struck down as being “inconsistent with the Christian religion.”136 
In contrast to Story’s subtle affirmation of the Christian nation 
maxim was an 1811 opinion written by James Kent while he served 
129. Id. at 525, 529.
130. Id. at 529.
131. Id. at 530.
132. Letter from Joseph Story to Sarah Waldo Story (Feb. 7, 1844), in 2 LIFE
AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 467, 468 (William W. Story ed., 1851). 
133. Vidal v. Girard’s Executor, 43 U.S. 127, 200 (1844).
134. Id. at 198.
135. Id. at 198, 201.
136. Id. at 201.
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as Chief Justice of the New York Supreme Court.137  In People v. 
Ruggles the defendant was convicted of “wickedly, maliciously, and 
blasphemously” uttering false and scandalous words that “Jesus 
Christ was a bastard, and his mother must be a whore.”138  The 
defendant appealed on the ground that New York did not have a 
statute criminalizing blasphemy and that his conviction conflicted 
with the state constitution’s guarantee of freedom of conscience.139  
Brushing aside Ruggles’ sound arguments, Kent upheld the 
conviction on the ground that Christianity was part of the state’s 
common law: “Christianity, in its enlarged sense, as a religion 
revealed and taught in the Bible, is not unknown to our law.”140  
Kent did more than simply affirm that the law recognized and 
reinforced certain Christian principles by declaring the nation’s 
dependence on Christianity.  Christian discipline and virtue, 
“which help to bind society together,” were essential interests of 
civil government, Kent wrote, and “whatever strikes at the root of 
[C]hristianity, tends manifestly to the dissolution of civil
government.”141  Here, Kent conflated the ideas of the law’s
recognition of Christianity with Christianity serving as a
foundational principle for government.  Referencing New York,
Kent declared that the framers of the state constitution “never
meant to withdraw religion in general, and with it the best
sanctions of moral and social obligation from all consideration and
notice of law.”142  On the contrary, he noted, the law “assumes that
we are a [C]hristian people, and the morality of the country is
deeply ingrafted upon Christianity.”143
People v. Ruggles was a seminal case for the propositions that 
Christianity served as a foundation of republican government and 
that the law in turn enforced certain Christian principles.  It was 
cited throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century and 
137. People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290, 292–93 (N.Y. 1811).
138. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
139. Id. at 295–97.
140. Id. at 297.
141. Id. at 293–94.
142. Id. at 296.
143. Id. at 295.
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served as precedent for other legal areas where judges affirmed the 
authority of Christianity in the law and civil government.144  
A. Blasphemy
Blasphemy was usually a common law offense, a carry-over
from the time of religious establishments when civil courts would 
enforce crimes against the official church.  Without an established 
church in the United States, judges justified blasphemy 
prosecutions for the effect on society writ large, insisting that 
blasphemy tended to “corrupt the morals of the people[ ] and to 
destroy good order.”145  Despite that rationale, the offense did not 
require evidence that anyone was corrupted or that the words 
actually disturbed the peace or interfered with religious worship; 
instead, it operated on an assumption of a Christian foundation for 
morals and public order and of the law’s obligation to protect and 
promote Christian principles.146 
No more than a handful of blasphemy prosecutions were 
reported during the nineteenth century, with the last significant 
case occurring in 1837.147  In each case, prosecutors relied on some 
formulation of the Christian nation maxim.148   
Three reported appeals of blasphemy convictions are 
particularly notable for the way the judges employed the Christian 
nation maxim to uphold the convictions.  In one case, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared that the defendant’s 
assertion that “the Holy Scriptures were a mere fable,” made in a 
private debating society, revealed a “malicious intention” to “vilify 
the Christian religion” and were punishable.149  Further, it posited 
that “[n]o free government now exists in the world, unless where 
144. See Note, Blasphemy, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 694, 702-10 (1970).
145. Id. at 694.
146. See GREEN, supra note 79, at 162–69, 174–78; LEVY, supra note 92,
400–23; Note, supra note 144, at 694–723. 
147. See Note, supra note 144, at 696, 702-10.  Blasphemy was a minor
behavioral offense, so most prosecutions occurred in a municipal or justice of 
the peace court and were never reported or appealed.  See LEVY, supra note 92, 
at 400–01. It is impossible to know the true number of cases.  Id. 
148. See Note, supra note 144, at 702–10.
149. Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawle 394, 398–99 (Pa.
1824). 
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Christianity is acknowledged, and is the religion of the country.”150  
Christianity was “the only stable support of all human laws.”151  
Similar ill-affection toward Christianity was present in the other 
two cases: the blasphemous statements represented a “malicious 
and wanton attack on the [C]hristian religion”152 and a desire “to 
destroy the veneration due to [God].”153  In all instances, there was 
no evidence that the defendants’ utterances had disturbed the 
peace; they had simply struck at Christianity, which was “the 
preserver of the peace and good order of society.”154  The role that 
Christianity played was not simply persuasive but was “said to be 
the foundation of all human laws,” declared the Delaware Supreme 
Court; “without this religion no nation has ever yet continued 
free.”155  Blasphemy prosecutions declined in mid-century, evolving 
into civil offenses such as profane swearing and disorderly conduct, 
which required evidence of an actual public disturbance.156  During 
their reign, however, blasphemy decisions represented one of the 
clearer applications of the Christian nation maxim in American 
law. 
B. Sunday Laws
The idea that Christianity served as a foundation for the law
and government found application in other areas of the law 
including Sunday law enforcement, oath requirements, probate 
law, and domestic law.157  At times, reliance on the maxim was 
subtle without an express affirmation of the principle; in other 
instances, the presence of the maxim was more pronounced.  
Because of the historical connection between Christianity and 
Sunday observance, enforcement of laws prohibiting work, 
transportation, and entertainment on Sundays was a prime vehicle 
150. Id. at 406.
151. Id. at 407.
152. State v. Chandler, 2 Del. (2 Harr.) 553, 555 (Gen. Sess. 1837).
153. Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) 206, 220 (1838).  For
a detailed account of Kneeland, see The Trial of Abner Kneeland, in 13 
AMERICAN STATE TRIALS 450–575 (John D. Lawson, ed., 1921). 
154. Chandler, 2 Del. at 563.
155. Chandler, 2 Del. at 557–58, 560.
156. See Green, supra note 79, at 239.
157. See generally Stuart Banner, When Christianity Was Part of the Com-
mon Law, 16 L. & HIST. REV. 27 (1998). 
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for affirming the nation’s Christian character.  For at least the first 
half of the nineteenth century, judges readily acknowledged the 
religious functions of Sunday laws, chiefly to promote public piety 
and to demonstrate a collective societal respect for the Lord’s Day. 
As the Alabama Supreme Court wrote almost casually in 1843, 
“[w]e do not think the design of the legislature in the passage of the 
act can be doubted.  It was evidently to promote and advance the 
interest of religion, by prohibiting all persons from engaging in 
their common and ordinary avocations of business, or employment, 
on Sunday.”158  Enforcement of Sunday or “Sabbath” laws varied 
widely, but when enforced, their sanctions came down particularly 
hard on religious minorities—Jews, Seventh Day Baptists, and 
Seventh-day Adventists—often in the form of hefty fines and 
imprisonment.159  As with blasphemy, prosecutors initially faced no 
obligation to show that the Sabbath violation disturbed other’s 
religious worship or caused a public annoyance; rather, actions 
deemed inconsistent with the Sabbath were considered 
“constructively a breach of the peace” because of their affront to the 
Lord’s Day and their tendency to create a bad example.160  
By acknowledging the religious function of Sunday laws, judges 
implicitly affirmed the relationship between the law and 
Christianity; in several cases, however, judges candidly 
acknowledged that connection.  In an 1834 case, the Maryland 
Court of Appeals declared that “[t]he Sabbath is emphatically the 
day of rest, and the day of rest here is the ‘Lord’s day’ or 
[C]hristian’s Sunday.”161  Maryland was “a [C]hristian community,
and a day set apart as the day of rest, is the day consecrated by the
resurrection of our Saviour.”162  “Sunday or the Sabbath is properly
and emphatically called the Lord’s day,” concurred the Arkansas
Supreme Court in 1850, “and is one amongst the first and most
sacred institutions of the [C]hristian religion.  This system of
religion is recognized as constituting part and parcel of the common
158. O’Donnell v. Sweeney, 5 Ala. 467, 469 (1843).
159. See KYLE G. VOLK, MORAL MINORITES AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 37–68 (2014). 
160. Pearce v. Atwood, 13 Mass. 324, 347 (1816) (emphasis in original).
161. Kilgour v. Miles, 6 Gill & Johns. 268, 274 (Md. 1834) (emphasis in orig-
inal). 
162. Id.
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law, and as such all of the institutions growing out of it . . . .”163  
And a New York trial court asserted in 1861 that the “stability of 
government, [and] the welfare of the subject and interests of 
society” required “that the day of rest observed by the people of the 
nation should be uniform, and that its observance should be to some 
extent compulsory.”164  Not only were Sabbath laws proof of the 
law’s relationship to Christianity, the religion they protected 
constituted the linchpin that held together republican society.   
One notable Sunday law decision was the 1846 case of City 
Council of Charleston v. Benjamin.165  The defendant, a Jewish 
merchant, was fined forty dollars for opening his store on Sunday, 
and he requested a bench trial.166  Benjamin received a surprising 
decision from the judge who dismissed the fine, writing that the law 
could not stand in “a community where there is complete severance 
between Church and State, and where entire freedom of religious 
faith and worship is guaranteed to all its citizens alike.”167  The 
prosecutor appealed that holding, arguing that “[C]hristianity is a 
part of the common law” and that it served as “the foundation of 
those morals and manners upon which our society is formed.”168 
The appeal presented the South Carolina Supreme Court with a 
clear choice between two competing values: church-state separation 
or America’s Christian nationhood.  Not surprisingly, the high court 
chose the latter principle.169  The court initially affirmed the 
religious basis for Sunday laws, stating that they properly 
reminded people of “the Resurrection” and “the first visible triumph 
over death, hell, and the grave!”170  Indulging majoritarian 
tendencies, the court emphasized, “[o]n that day we rest, and to us 
it is the Sabbath of the Lord¾its decent observance, in a Christian-
community, is that which ought to be expected.”171  Sunday 
163. Shover v. State, 10 Ark. 259, 263 (1850).
164. Lindenmuller v. People, 33 Barb. 548, 568 (N.Y. 1861).
165. City Council of Charleston v. Benjamin, 33 S.C.L. (2 Strob.) 508, 509
(1848). 
166. Id.
167. Id. at 511.
168. Id. at 520.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 521.
171. Id.
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observance was not just a moral obligation; its legal enforcement 
was justified because “the Christian religious is part of the common 
law of South Carolina!”172  The court declared that Christianity’s 
influences extended beyond the law into “the foundation of even the 
Article of the Constitution under consideration.”173  In fact, the 
court continued, “[i]t was Christianity robed in light, and 
descending as the dove upon our ancestors,” that inspired them to 
create a government based on liberty.174  Courts would continue to 
affirm a religious basis for Sunday laws throughout the remainder 
of the century, although those rationales were gradually replaced 
with justifications based on health and public welfare rationales.175 
C. Oaths
The Christian nation maxim also impacted judicial
determinations of the necessity and substance of oath requirements 
for participating in legal proceedings.  The traditional common law 
rule was that for a witness, juror, or declarant to be competent to 
testify or undertake a legal obligation, he had to assert a belief not 
only in God but also in the accountability of his soul after death for 
swearing falsely.176  When rigorously enforced, this rule excluded 
Jews, Universalists, skeptics, and sometimes Catholics from 
undertaking important legal functions.177  Early antebellum judges 
regularly affirmed the connection between the oath requirement 
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 522.
175. The transition to secular justifications for Sunday laws began in mid-
century.  In 1849, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld that state’s Sabbath law, 
prohibiting acts deemed contrary to the “common and religious observance of 
the day,” but only over a vigorous dissent.  Sellers v. Dugan, 18 Ohio 489, 490 
(1849).  Four years later the majority of the Ohio Supreme Court changed 
course, insisting that Sunday was merely a civil day of rest from labor.  Bloom 
v. Richards, 2 Ohio St. 388, 390 (1853).  The court expressly disavowed that
Christianity formed a part of the law in Ohio: “it follows that neither [C]hris-
tianity, nor any other system of religion, is part of the law of the state.”  Id.
The court averred, “[w]e have no union of church and state, nor has our gov-
ernment ever been vested with authority to enforce any religious observance,
simply because it is religious.”  Id. at 387.  See GREEN, supra note 79, at 231-47.
176. D. X. JUNKIN, THE OATH: A DIVINE ORDINANCE, AND AN ELEMENT OF THE
SOCIAL CONSTITUTION 1 (1845). 
177. Id. at 72, 186–87.
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and the law’s Christian basis, often extending that connection to 
reinforce notions of the nation’s religious foundations.178  In the 
1820 case of Jackson v. Gridley, the New York Supreme Court held 
that a Universalist could not be sworn as a witness because he 
lacked an orthodox belief in God and in a future state of 
punishments and rewards.179  Repeating the traditional rule, the 
court held that testimony was not competent or admissible, “unless 
delivered under the solemnity of an oath, which comes home to the 
conscience of the witness, and will create a tie arising from his belief 
that false swearing would expose him to punishment in the life to 
come.”180  In the court’s mind, the rule did more than merely ensure 
the trustworthiness of oral testimony.181  The oath, with its appeal 
to God, sanctified the legal process: “[o]n this great principle rest 
all our institutions, and especially the distribution of justice 
between man and man.”182  To abolish the oath’s religious 
requirements, wrote another judge, would undermine the entire 
judicial system because there would be no “tie upon his conscience, 
and of course, that sanction which the law requires.”183  Arguments 
that the oath requirement violated principles of religious freedom 
and equality failed because “Christianity is a part of the common 
law of the land.”184  The oath, therefore, continually reaffirmed the 
religious foundations of the law and of God’s ultimate authority 
over matters of truth.185   
Religious justifications for behavioral laws dropped off as the 
nineteenth century progressed.  This was due to a growing religious 
diversity, expanding notions of religious toleration, and the 
178. Id. at 219.
179. Jackson v. Gridley, 18 Johns. 98, 103 (N.Y. 1820).
180. Id. at 106.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Atwood v. Welton, 7 Conn. 66, 73–74 (1828).
184. Id. at 76.
185. As with the transition that occurred with Sunday law justifications, as
the nineteenth century progressed, judges slowly liberalized the oath require-
ments, first removing the necessity of affirming a belief in a future state of 
rewards and punishments, and then transitioning to allowing declarants to 
swear to a religious obligation to tell the truth.  See GREEN, supra note 79, at 
214–18.  
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professionalization of the legal profession.186  As the law was called 
on to respond and adapt to new developments, such as 
industrialization and corporations, an emphasis on the moral 
quality of the law gave way to more practicable virtues of 
adaptability and predictability.187  Statutes, with their set 
remedies, came to replace the common law with its moral quality. 
Over time, the institution of the law became amoral.188   
D. Treatise Writers
This evolving “secularization” of the law did not forestall
popular claims about the religious foundations for law and 
government; in fact, fears about the secularization of society may 
have fueled such claims in reaction to this perceived shift.  During 
the second half of the nineteenth century, a new generation of 
writers picked up on the narrative promoted by Robert Baird and 
Benjamin Morris.189  Some of the Christian nation claims were 
pronounced, while others were more subtle.  Writing near the end 
of the century, Presbyterian minister, Isaac A. Cornelison, 
responded to the perceived secularizing trend in the culture and to 
efforts “towards a still further restriction of the religious function 
of civil government.”190  It was a “well-established fact,” Cornelison 
wrote, that “the civil institutions of this country are necessarily, 
rightfully, and lawfully Christian.”191  This was demonstrated by 
the religious inclinations of the Founders and their efforts to 
incorporate Christian principles into the operations of 
government.192  Thus, the trend, “which requires the removal of 
every vestige of Christian basis, motive, and purpose from its laws, 
is unwarranted.”193  Cornelison called for renewed enforcement of 
Sunday laws and even a revival of blasphemy prosecutions: “[t]he 
186. Id. at 214, 216.
187. Id. at 207 (citing MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW 1780–1860, at 1, 4 (1977)). 
188. Id.
189. Id. at 102-03.
190. ISAAC C. CORNELISON, THE RELATION OF RELIGION TO CIVIL
GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 175–76 (1895). 
191. Id. at 164.
192. Id. at 372.
193. Id. at 308–09.
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government possesses a positively religious character; it is 
Christian,” Cornelison asserted, “and to modify its regulation of a 
Christian observance in accommodation to the views of the 
irreligious or the anti-Christian” would invite anarchy.194  
Sounding an ominous warning, Cornelison insisted that “[i]f the 
government is Christian, the anti-Christian must be regarded as in 
that respect an enemy” of the nation.195  
Taking a less threatening tone were treatises by church 
historians Philip Schaff and Sanford H. Cobb.  Building on the 
hagiographic accounts of the founding period, Schaff asserted that 
“the framers of the Constitution were, without exception, believers 
in God and in future rewards and punishments . . . .  All recognized 
the hand of Divine Providence in leading them through the war of 
independence.”196  As a result, Schaff remarked, the Constitution 
“is Christian in substance, though not in form.  It is pervaded by 
the spirit of justice and humanity, which are Christian.  The First 
Amendment could not have originated in any pagan or 
Mohammedan country, but presupposes Christian civilization and 
culture.”197  Sanford Cobb agreed with Schaff’s account, insisting 
the argument that “the American constitutions are unchristian. . . . 
is specious, appealing only to a superficial religious sentiment.”198  
Documenting the various religious affirmations contained in state 
constitutions, official proclamations, and behavioral laws, Cobb 
concluded that from “the constant resort in legislation and 
judicature to religious and Christian principles—we may safely 
declare that, if the American people be not a Christian nation, there 
is none upon the earth.”199 
Legal treatise writers during the latter-half of the nineteenth 
century were generally more restrained, though many repeated 
modified claims that the law incorporated Christian principles. 
This was due in no small part to the long shadow cast by Joseph 
Story’s writings, which later legal writers continued to cite as 
194. Id. at 373–74.
195. Id. at 374.
196. PHILIP SCHAFF, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 41 (New
York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1888). 
197. Id. at 40.
198. SANFORD H. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA 524
(New York, Cooper Square Pub., 1902). 
199. Id. at 525.
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authority.  As a result, in his influential Constitutional Limitations, 
Thomas Cooley wrote that “[i]t is frequently said that Christianity 
is a part of the law of the land.  In a certain sense and for certain 
purposes this is true.”200  Yet, he did not relate how laws concerning 
“family and social relations” and public behavior relied on Christian 
precepts.201  Cooley also asserted that there was nothing in the 
Constitution that prohibited official acknowledgements of God or 
officials from “recognizing a superintending Providence” behind the 
nation’s founding: “the notorious fact [was] that the prevailing 
religion in the States is Christian.”202  Henry Campbell Black’s 
Handbook of American Constitutional Law offered a similarly 
measured account of the maxim.203  Citing to Story, Black wrote 
that the “statement that Christianity is part of the law of the land 
must be taken in a qualified and limited sense.”204  But whatever 
those limitations, Black maintained that “many of our best civil and 
social institutions, and the most important to be preserved in a free 
and civilized state, are founded upon the Christian religion.”205  As 
a result, Black felt comfortable asserting that “the whole purpose 
and policy of the law assume[s] that we are a nation of Christians, 
and while toleration is the principle in religious matters, the laws 
are to recognize the existence of that system of faith, and our 
institutions are to be based on that assumption.”206   
Despite promoting a moderate form of the maxim, the law 
writers’ endorsement of the Christian foundations for law and 
government had the effect of validating the concept for later 
generations while fostering the idea of Christian privilege within 
the law with non-Christians merely being tolerated.  More 
important, both the legal and popular religious authors asserted 
that there was no inconsistency between the Christian nation 
maxim and the Constitution’s provisions regarding religious free 
200. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
670 (7th ed. 1903). 
201. Id.
202. Id. at 669.
203. HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 390 (1895). 
204. Id. (citing 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES §§ 1877, 1879 (1833)). 
205. Id.
206. Id. at 391.
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exercise, non-establishment, and no religious tests.  In reconciling 
these seemingly contradictory principles, these authors effectively 
made the latter subject to the former and limited the scope and 
understanding of non-establishment and religious equality.   
E. The “Christian Nation” Decision
One final nineteenth-century acknowledgement of America’s
Christian nationhood is worth noting, if for no other reason than it 
came from the United States Supreme Court.  In 1892, the Supreme 
Court heard a case brought by a prominent New York City 
Episcopal church after it was fined for hiring a foreign minister in 
violation of an immigration law.207  Holy Trinity Church v. United 
States called upon the justices to rule whether the anti-foreign 
recruitment provision of the immigration law applied to entities 
such as churches.208  Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice David 
J. Brewer held that Congress had not intended the hiring
restriction to apply to “ministers of the gospel or, indeed any class
whose toil is of the brain.”209  Instead, wrote Brewer, Congress
meant the statute to apply “only to the work of the manual laborer,
as distinguished from that of the professional man.”210  Rather than
ending his opinion there, Brewer offered a second reason for
reversing the fine.211  According to Brewer, America was a
“Christian nation” that had been founded by religious people who
had formed a government based on religious principles.212  The
nation’s laws and charters recognized the importance of
Christianity and accommodated its practice.213  As support for his
statement that America was a Christian nation Brewer quoted
extensively from colonial charters and early state constitutions that
acknowledged God’s authority over human action or that favored
Christianity.214  Brewer also referred to several state cases where
207. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 458 (1892).
208. Id.; see Steven K. Green, Justice David Josiah Brewer and the “Chris-
tian Nation” Maxim, 63 ALB. L. REV. 427, 444–45 (1999). 
209. Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 463.
210. Id.
211. See id. at 465–66.
212. Id. at 470–71.
213. Id. at 465–67.
214. Id.
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judges had declared Christianity to be part of the common law.215  
Finally, he noted the prevalence of Christian institutions and of 
how Christianity informed various customs.216  For Brewer, all of 
this evidence led to one conclusion: 
These, and many other matters which might be noticed, 
add a volume of unofficial declarations to the mass of 
organic utterances that this is a Christian nation.  In the 
face of all these, shall it be believed that a congress of the 
United States intended to make it a misdemeanor for a 
church of this country to contract for the services of a 
Christian minister residing in another nation?217 
The Court’s “Christian Nation” decision, as it became known, 
did not go unnoticed.  Religious conservatives cited to it as authority 
in attempts to prevent the Chicago Columbian Exposition from 
opening on Sundays, and the opinion fueled a drive for a proposed 
constitutional amendment to insert an acknowledgement of God in 
the Preamble.218  Brewer, a moderate evangelical, was proud of his 
opinion, and for the next eighteen years of his life he spoke and 
wrote about the subject with enthusiasm.219  Through two works in 
particular, American Citizenship (1902) and The United States A 
Christian Nation (1905), both of which were based on a series of 
college lectures, Brewer elaborated on the themes raised in Holy 
Trinity:220  “[C]hristianity has entered into and become part of the 
life of this republic,” Brewer maintained, such that “the principles 
of [C]hristianity [serve as] the foundations of our social and political 
life.”221  Brewer understood the meaning of the maxim in several 
ways.  The first was historical, that many American colonies were 
founded by devoutly religious people who sought to establish 
communities based on Christian principles.222  America’s 
215. Id. at 470.
216. Id. at 471.
217. Id. (emphasis added).
218. Green, supra note 208, at 463–66.
219. See id. at 448–50.
220. See generally DAVID J. BREWER, THE UNITED STATES A CHRISTIAN
NATION (1905) [hereinafter A CHRISTIAN NATION]; DAVID J. BREWER, AMERICAN
CITIZENSHIP (1902) [hereinafter AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP]. 
221. AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, supra note 220, at 20.
222. Green, supra note 208, at 448–49.
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“beginnings were in a marked and marvelous degree identified with 
Christianity.”223  Brewer also believed America was Christian in a 
cultural-demographic sense and that Christian traditions and 
beliefs influenced daily customs and practices.224  In addition, he 
posited that America’s Christian culture represented the highest 
form of civilization.225  Like many of his contemporaries, Brewer’s 
assertion went hand-in-hand with a belief in the superiority of 
Anglo-American culture.  “The most thoroughly Christian nation is 
the most civilized,” he claimed.226  Finally, Brewer believed that 
Christian values informed the law and the nation’s public 
institutions: “I could show how largely our laws and customs are 
based upon the laws of Moses and the teachings of Christ,” he 
wrote.227  Yet, Brewer saw that proposition as having limited 
application:  “I do not mean that as a nation we should have a state 
religion, or that by secular means we support any form of 
Christianity.”228  Brewer strongly believed that two attributes of a 
Christian nation were a respect for religious liberty and the 
existence of separation of church and state.229  Religious liberty—
the right to believe and practice the religion of one’s choice—was at 
the heart of the freedoms epitomized by a Christian nation:  “[E]ach 
[person] stands alone with his conscience,” Brewer maintained.230  
He continued, “[n]o one is in duty bound as a citizen to attend a 
particular church service, or indeed any church service.  The 
freedom of conscience, the liberty of the individual, gives to every 
individual the right to stay away.”231  Brewer also understood the 
maxim to be consistent with church-state separation: 
223. A CHRISTIAN NATION, supra note 220, at 13; see AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 
supra note 220, at 21–22. 
224. Green, supra note 208, at 450.
225. See A CHRISTIAN NATION, supra note 220, at 65.
226. See id.; Green, supra note 208, at 452.
227. See A CHRISTIAN NATION, supra note 220, at 39.
228. Green, supra note 208, at 448–49 (quoting David J. Brewer, A Plea for
the Bible, RAM’S HORN, Sept. 10, 1904, at 27). 
229. Id. at 458.
230. AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, supra note 220, at 22; Green, supra note 208,
at 458. 
231. A CHRISTIAN NATION, supra note 220, at 54; Green, supra note 208, at
448.
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We have no state church, and the settled rule in this 
country is of entire separation between state and church, 
and yet that separation is not so complete that the state is 
indifferent to the welfare and prosperity of the church. 
This is a Christian commonwealth.  We believe that the 
best interests of both are promoted by enforcing entire 
separation between the state and the church . . . .232 
Brewer thus offered a nuanced understanding of what it meant 
to say that America was a Christian nation.  In no place did he 
suggest the maxim should be used to enforce Christian mores on 
unwilling people or to marginalize religious minorities. 
Unfortunately, most commentators at the time and since have not 
explored Brewer’s detailed meaning.233  For religious conservatives 
in particular, the Holy Trinity opinion was confirmation from no 
less an authority than the Supreme Court that America was and 
remained a Christian nation;234 the American Sabbath Union 
effused that “this important decision rests upon the fundamental 
principle that religion is imbedded in the organic structure of the 
American government” and “establishes clearly the fact that our 
Government is Christian.”235  As a legal holding, Brewer’s 
statements in Holy Trinity have not withstood the test of time, with 
later justices calling the decision an “aberration”236 and his 
declaration “arrogant[ ]” and a “long step backward.” 237  Yet, his 
Christian nation declaration has lived on in popular religious 
literature, adding authority to claims of America’s Christian 
232. Comm’rs of Wyandotte Cty. v. First Presbyterian Church of Wyan-
dotte, 1 P. 109, 112 (Kan. 1883). 
233. Green, supra note 208, at 430.
234. Id. at 462–68; see also CORNELISON, supra note 190, at 144–47 (noting
the Court’s affirmation of Christianity as part of the public life and customs of 
the United States). 
235. Green, supra note 208, at 463, 463 n.268 (quoting THE PEARL OF DAYS, 
May 7, 1892 reprinted in WILLIAM ADDISON BLAKELY, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS
BEARING ON SUNDAY LEGISLATION, at 508 n.1 (William Allen Colcord ed., Da 
Capo Press rev. and enlarged ed. 1970) (1891)).  
236. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 641 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
237. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 717–18 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). 
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nationhood.  Modern Christian nation proponents quote it 
regularly.238   
III. MODERN APPLICATIONS
By the early twentieth century, the maxim that America was a 
Christian nation had lost most of its resiliency.  Several factors 
contributed to this change.  Within legal philosophy, the popularity 
of natural law had declined, supplanted by amoral schools of legal 
positivism and legal realism.239  Law was based on human will, and 
nothing more.240  Culturally, American Protestantism splintered 
into followers of the Social Gospel, Modernism, mainstream 
Evangelicalism, and Fundamentalism,241 with the first two 
factions questioning claims of the nation’s “chosen” status and of a 
special relationship between Christianity and democratic 
government.242  In contrast, Fundamentalism, with its pessimistic 
pre-millennial eschatology, saw itself at odds with what it perceived 
to be a sinful culture that was nonredeemable.243  The horrors of 
World War I also destroyed the earlier Protestant sense of an 
optimistic Christian America exceptionalism.244  Finally, the early 
1900s witnessed the rise of the ecumenical interfaith movement 
that promoted religious pluralism and a national identity in terms 
of a broadly conceived Judeo-Christian culture.245  All of these 
238. See, e.g., MYTH OF SEPARATION, supra note 27, at 83; DEMAR, supra note
16, at 11–13.
239. See generally Michael Steven Green, Legal Realism as Theory of Law,
46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1915 (2005) (examining the strengths and weaknesses 
of legal realist theory and noting its rejection of the connection between law 
and morality present in natural law theory); Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Three 
Antinomies of Modern Legal Positivism and Their Resolution in Christian Le-
gal Thought, 18 REGENT U. L. REV. 53 (2005) (discussing the history and phi-
losophy of legal positivism and natural law, as expressed by Catholic leaders, 
and examining the tensions between the two). 
240. See Green, supra note 239, at 1927-36.
241. See ROBERT T. HANDY, UNDERMINED ESTABLISHMENT: CHURCH-STATE
RELATIONS IN AMERICA 1880–1920 126-36, 139-52 (2016). 
242. See id. at 98–112.
243. See MATTHEW AVERY SUTTON, AMERICAN APOCALYPSE: A HISTORY OF
MODERN EVANGELICALISM 79-113 (2014). 
244. See HANDY, supra note 241, at 186.
245. See id. at 178–82, 187–89; see also K. HEALAN GASTON, IMAGINING
JUDEO-CHRISTIAN AMERICA: RELIGION, SECULARISM, AND THE REDEFINITION OF
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occurrences were at odds with claims of America’s Christian 
nationhood, which lost favor within polite society.  
Exceptions existed.  Woodrow Wilson, likely the most 
religiously devout president until Jimmy Carter, famously declared 
that “America was born a Christian nation.  America was born to 
exemplify that devotion to the elements of righteousness which are 
derived from the revelations of Holy Scripture.”246  Similarly, a 
noticeable strain of Christian nationalism appeared with the rise of 
post-war nationalism, “100 percent Americanism,” and the 
resurgence of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s.247  But, generally, the 
maxim was not promoted to the same degree as it had been in the 
nineteenth century and all but disappeared in legal treatises and 
political histories, the latter field, now dominated by members of 
the “Progressive” school of history which emphasized the nation’s 
social and economic inequalities, not America’s exceptionalism.248  
This may suggest that aside from the resurgence of Christian 
nationalism in popular literature in the late-twentieth century, the 
Christian nation maxim is dead as a legal concept.  Certainly, the 
Supreme Court’s initial church-state decisions were hostile to 
claims of a religious basis for government or law.  Both Everson v. 
Board of Education (1947) and McCollum v. Board of Education 
(1948), with their embrace of a strict-separationist approach to 
church-state relations, presumed the secular nature of the law and 
government.249  “The Constitution requires, not comprehensive 
identification of state with religion, but complete separation,” wrote 
Justice Wiley Rutledge.250  In fact, a main criticism of the Court’s 
DEMOCRACY 1–18 (2019) (summarizing themes of Judeo-Christian America 
from the First World War to the present). 
246. RICHARD V. PIERARD & ROBERT D. LINDER, CIVIL RELIGION AND THE 
PRESIDENCY 153 (1988). 
247. See WALTER A. MCDOUGAL, THE TRAGEDY OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: HOW
AMERICA’S CIVIL RELIGION BETRAYED THE NATIONAL INTEREST 175-77 (2019). 
248. See GASTON, supra note 245, at 46–59; see generally CHARLES A. BEARD, 
AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
(1913). 
249. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Ed., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (invoking
Jefferson’s “wall” between church and state (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Ed., 330 
U.S. 1, 16 (1947))); Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 
98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879)). 
250. Everson, 330 U.S. at 60 (Rutledge, J., dissenting); see also McCollum,
333 U.S. at 217 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (maintaining that a secular public 
school was “a symbol of our secular unity”). 
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decisions was that it had unnecessarily endorsed a legal and 
cultural regime of secularism in conflict with the nation’s religious 
traditions.251  That ongoing critique, combined with the rise of Cold 
War anti-Communism and a spiritual reawakening in the 1950s, 
led the justices to backtrack in their rhetoric in Zorach v. Clauson 
(1952).252  There, a six-justice majority again reaffirmed the value 
of church-state separation—“[t]here cannot be the slightest doubt 
that the First Amendment reflects the philosophy that Church and 
State should be separated”—while asserting that “[w]e are a 
religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme 
Being.”253  Even though the latter statement sounded reminiscent 
of Christian nation rhetoric, it was consistent with the popular 
religious rhetoric of the time, epitomized by President Dwight 
Eisenhower’s iconic statement: “our form of government has no 
sense unless it is founded in a deeply-felt religious faith, and I don’t 
care what it is.”254   
Likewise, the movements behind the eventual insertion of “one 
nation under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance, the adoption of “In 
God we Trust” as the national motto, and its placement on U.S. 
currency reflected a widespread desire to equate a sense of 
religiosity with the “American Way of Life,” in contrast to godless 
Communism.255  While both successful drives suggested a vague 
sense of Christian nationalism, most scholars and church-state 
advocates at the time perceived both affirmations to be innocuous—
“so conventional and uncontroversial as to be constitutional,” wrote 
one legal scholar—and chiefly reflective of a national civil 
251. See DANNEL MCCOLLUM, THE LORD WAS NOT ON TRIAL: THE INSIDE 
STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT’S PRECEDENT-SETTING MCCOLLUM RULING 
193-208 (2008).
252. James E. Zucker, Better a Catholic Than a Communist: Reexamining
McCollum v. Board of Education and Zorach v. Clauson, 93 VA. L. REV. 2069, 
2104-18 (2007). 
253. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312–14 (1952).
254. KEVIN KRUSE, ONE NATION UNDER GOD 67–68 (2015); see generally 
ROBERT S. ELLWOOD, THE FIFTIES SPIRITUAL MARKETPLACE: AMERICAN RELIGION 
IN A DECADE OF CONFLICT (1997); MARK SILK, SPIRITUAL POLITICS: RELIGION AND 
AMERICA SINCE WORLD WAR II (1989). 
255. KRUSE, supra note 254, at 100–25.  In fact, the chief group behind the
Pledge of Allegiance addition was the Knights of Columbus, a Catholic frater-
nal organization, not evangelical Protestants.  Id. at 100–10. 
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religion.256  In contrast, around the same time Congress rejected a 
proposal to adopt an amendment to the Constitution that would 
have declared that “[t]his Nation devoutly recognizes the authority 
and law of Jesus Christ, Savior and Rule of nations through whom 
are bestowed the blessings of Almighty God.”257  Ceremonial 
acknowledgments of God were acceptable, but not an amendment 
to make the Constitution officially “Christian.”258 
Over the next two decades, the Supreme Court continued to 
affirm the secular nature of the nation’s character, laws, and 
institutions, though at times maintaining that the paradigm of 
pluralism more accurately reflected the correct understanding of 
church-state relations. In 1961, the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of Sunday closing laws, turning back challenges 
based on both the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clause.259  
Chief Justice Earl Warren went through legal gymnastics to 
demonstrate that the laws were secular health-welfare regulations, 
despite their admittedly religious origins.260  “In light of the 
evolution of our Sunday Closing Laws through the centuries, and of 
their more or less recent emphasis upon secular considerations, . . . 
presently they bear no relationship to establishment of religion as 
those words are used in the Constitution,” Warren concluded.261  In 
a another church-state case that term the Court struck down a state 
requirement that public office-holders affirm a belief in God.262  
Like Sabbath laws, religious oaths were a relic of colonial times that 
presupposed an interdependence between religion and 
government.263  Rejecting that pattern, Justice Hugo Black 
reaffirmed that the correct arrangement was one of church-state 
separation as announced in Everson and McCollum.264 
256. See id. at 98-100; see also FEA, supra note 16, at 50–51.
257. KRUSE, supra note 254, at 95–100.
258. See id.
259. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 428, 453 (1961).
260. See id. at 444–45.
261. See id. at 444.
262. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495–96 (1961).  For the other church-
state decisions during that term, see Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. 
v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961);
Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
263. See Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 490.
264. Id. at 492–96.
470 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.26:430 
Then, in 1962 and 1963, the high Court handed down two of its 
more controversial and consequential church-state holdings ever, 
Engel v. Vitale and School District of Abington Township v. 
Schempp, striking down prayer and Bible reading in the nation’s 
public schools.265  Despite consciously employing moderating 
rhetoric to counter claims that the decisions reflected an anti-
religious animus, both decisions put the justices squarely behind 
the proposition that public schools, like other public institutions, 
were to be secular: “a secular program of education.”266  The Court 
acknowledged the nation’s religious heritage—it was “true that 
religion has been closely identified with our history and 
government”—but noted that “this Court has rejected 
unequivocally the contention that the Establishment Clause forbids 
only governmental preference of one religion over another.”267  The 
idea that America was a Christian nation that promoted Christian 
principles through laws and policy was inconsistent with the 
Court’s holdings. 
In Engel and Schempp, the Court had affirmed that the 
government’s stance toward religion should be one of “neutrality,” 
rather than using the word “secularity.”268  That conscious use of 
terminology supported the idea of religious pluralism as an 
alternative paradigm to secularism.  So, in Walz v. Tax 
Commission, the Court upheld the longstanding practice of states 
providing property tax exemptions for houses of worship.269  
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren Burger stated that 
the proper stance of the government toward religion should be one 
of “benevolent neutrality” so as to “permit religious exercise to exist 
without sponsorship and without interference.”270  The implication 
was that the government should not impose a regime of secularism, 
265. See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962). 
266. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225 (“We agree of course that the State may
not establish a ‘religion of secularism’ in the sense of affirmatively opposing or 
showing hostility to religion, thus ‘preferring those who believe in no religion 
over those who do believe.’  We do not agree, however, that this decision in any 
sense has that effect.”); Engel, 370 U.S. at 433-35. 
267. Schempp 374 U.S. at 212, 216.
268. Id. at 226 (“In the relationship between man and religion, the State is
firmly committed to a position of neutrality.”). 
269. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 677-80 (1970).
270. Id. at 669.
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but one of neutrality toward religion that fostered religious 
pluralism, a point Justice William Brennan made clearer by 
asserting that the government “grants exemptions to religious 
organizations because they uniquely contribute to the pluralism of 
American society.”271  But this idea that the government could 
promote religious pluralism, even though a step beyond 
maintaining a stance of secularism, was still quite modest, with 
Burger noting that this authority was permissive, not mandated on 
the government, and that the Constitution simply allowed for a 
“play in the joints” between the free exercise and establishment 
clauses.272  This was a far cry from imposing a mandate upon the 
government to accommodate religion because of America’s heritage 
as a Christian nation. 
IV. THE REEMERGENCE OF THE MAXIM
The perspective that the Constitution established a regime of 
either secularity or religious neutrality continued into the early 
1980s, with the Court highlighting the need for government to 
maintain a secular stance in cases involving religion in public 
schools and public funding of religious schools273 and a neutral 
stance—permitting an accommodation to advance religious 
pluralism—in cases involving religious conduct.274  
That approach began to unravel, gradually, beginning in the 
1980s.  Several factors external to the Court helped to initiate this 
shift.  The first was the rise of the Religious Right, a movement of 
conservative Protestants who reacted to a cultural secularization 
brought on by the social revolution of the 1960s, the secularization 
of the academy, the school prayer decisions, Roe v. Wade, and the 
government’s revocation of tax exemptions for Christian 
segregationist educational institutions.275  Religious Right leaders 
271. Id. at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring).
272. Id. at 669 (majority opinion).
273. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40–43 (1980); Comm. for Pub. Educ.
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619–
20, 625 (1971).
274. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276–77 (1981); McDaniel v. Paty,
435 U.S. 618, 628-29 (1978); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214, 236 (1972). 
275. FEA, supra note 16, at 54–55; MATTHEW C. MOEN, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT 15–43 (1992); KENNETH D. WALD & 
ALLISON CALHOUN-BROWN, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES, 191–
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disagreed among themselves whether the nation’s government and 
institutions had been founded on Christian principles but had 
drifted from those moorings, or whether the nation’s Founders had 
wrongfully abjured those principles in establishing the new 
government.276  Despite those divergent views of the founding, both 
camps agreed on two essential points: the true authority for 
government came from God; and it was time for the nation to 
recognize that authority and for conservative Christians to 
(re)impose Christian values on the nation’s laws and 
institutions.277   
During this time a new generation of Christian nationalist 
authors emerged, gaining popularity among conservative 
evangelicals.  Two early influential figures were Rousas John 
Rushdoony and Francis Schaeffer.  Rushdoony was the founder of 
Christian Reconstructionism or “Dominion Theology,” which 
advocates establishing a Biblical theocratic republic based on Old 
Testament law and “the Lordship of Jesus Christ,” whereas 
Schaeffer argued for a tradition of biblical principles for 
government that went back to the Protestant Reformation.278  Both 
writers were highly influential on a generation of Religious Right 
leaders including Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson, D. James Kennedy 
and a host of authors of popular histories about the founding, 
including John Whitehead, David Barton, Tim LaHaye, and Gary 
DeMar, among others.279 
The second external event, facilitated in part by the first, was 
the election of Ronald Reagan as president and the alignment of the 
Republican Party with more culturally and morally conservative 
positions, including opposition to abortion, feminism, gay rights, 
224 (Traci Crowell & Mary Malley eds., Rowman & Littlefield 8th ed. 2018) 
(1987). 
276. FREDERICK CLARKSON, ETERNAL HOSTILITY: THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN 
THEOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY 83–87 (1997). 
277. Id.
278. ROBERT BOSTON, WHY THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT IS WRONG ABOUT
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 182–185 (1993); CLARKSON, supra note 276, 
at 77–89; SARA DIAMOND, ROADS TO DOMINION: RIGHT-WING MOVEMENTS AND 
POLITICAL POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 246–249 (1995); FEA, supra note 16, at 
54–56; JULIE J. INGERSOLL, BUILDING GOD’S KINGDOM: INSIDE THE WORLD OF
CHRISTIAN RECONSTRUCTION 14–27 (2015). 
279. BOSTON, supra note 278, at 189–91; FEA, supra note 16, at 57–75;
INGERSOLL, supra note 278, at 14–27. 
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and church-state separation.  This in turn brought about an 
alliance between the Republican Party and Christian conservatives 
and their leaders who espoused Christian nationalist ideas.280  
Reagan supported a constitutional amendment to permit prayer in 
public schools and legislation to restrict abortion access.281  And as 
noted, Reagan and then President George W. Bush regularly used 
rhetoric laced with forms of the Christian nation narrative.282 
That realignment, aided by twenty-plus years of Republican 
control of the White House, impacted the composition of the federal 
judiciary.  Prior to the early-1970s, the judicial philosophy and 
personal ideology of Republican-appointed federal judges did not 
vary that considerably from Democrat-appointed judges, 
particularly at the lower court level.283  That began to change, 
beginning with the appointment of William Rehnquist in 1973, as 
the social conservativism of nominees increasingly became a factor, 
as could be seen in the appointments of Antonin Scalia, Clarence 
Thomas, John Roberts, Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, Brett 
Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett, not to mention dozens of 
lower appellate judges.284  Although none of the people appointed 
to the Supreme Court espoused Christian nationalist views, their 
conservative political and social perspectives, combined with their 
embrace of originalism with its emphasis on rediscovering “original 
understandings” of constitutional values from the founding era, 
made them sympathetic to mild versions of the Christian nation 
narrative.285 
280. WALD & CALHOUN-BROWN, supra note 275, at 198–99, 205–08.
281. ASSOC. PRESS, Reagan Proposes School Prayer Amendment, N.Y. TIMES
(May 18, 1982), https://www.nytimes.com/1982/05/18/us/reagan-proposes-
school-prayer-amendment.html [perma.cc/J8S6-QAJU]; Steven V. Roberts, 
Reagan Backs Anti-Abortion Bill As Opponents Resume Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 9, 1982), https://www.nytimes.com/1982/09/09/us/reagan-backs-anti-
abortion-bill-as-opponents-resume-filibuster.html [perma.cc/9K2X-SFCW]. 
282. DAVID DOMKE & KEVIN COE, THE GOD STRATEGY: HOW RELIGION 
BECAME A POLITICAL WEAPON IN AMERICA 50–51, 53–61 (2008). 
283. See Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party Polar-
ization Turned the Supreme Court into a Partisan Court, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 
301, 310-17 (2016); see generally SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL
JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN (1997). 
284. See LAURA KALMAN, THE LONG REACH OF THE SIXTIES: LBJ, NIXON, AND 
THE MAKING OF THE CONTEMPORARY SUPREME COURT 307–31 (2017). 
285. WALD & CALHOUN-BROWN, supra note 275, at 90–92.
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The first modern Supreme Court decision to rely on the nation’s 
purported Christian heritage to resolve a church-state conflict was 
the 1983 case of Marsh v. Chambers, upholding the practice of paid 
legislative chaplains.286  Declining to apply the analytical standard 
from Lemon v. Kurtzman, with its secular purpose and primary 
religious effect inquiries, Chief Justice Burger applied a historical 
pedigree test.287  Noting that the First Congress had authorized the 
appointment of paid chaplains three days before finalizing the 
language of the First Amendment, Burger asserted syllogistically 
that this “historical evidence sheds light . . . on what the draftsmen 
intended the Establishment Clause to mean.”288  The holding did 
not turn solely on that timing coincidence, however; Burger also 
insisted that public prayer was “part of the fabric of our society.”289  
“To invoke Divine guidance on a public body entrusted with making 
the laws is not, in these circumstances, an ‘establishment’ of 
religion,” Burger wrote, and he concluded by quoting Zorach for the 
principle that “[w]e are a religious people whose institutions 
presuppose a Supreme Being.”290  Although justices had previously 
relied on historical data to inform their understanding of the 
purposes of the religion clauses,291 Marsh was the first decision in 
which historical “facts” were determinative of constitutionality.292   
Burger’s reliance on a mild version of the Christian nation 
narrative was not a one-shot deal.  The following year he authored 
an opinion upholding the public display of a city-owned nativity 
scene during Christmastime.293  This time, the practice lacked the 
same direct historical pedigree as legislative prayer; Burger could 
point to no contemporaneous practice of the government erecting 
286. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983).
287. See id. at 786-92.
288. Id. at 786-90.
289. Id. at 792.
290. Id. (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952)).
291. See, e.g., Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 267–278 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 
203, 213–20 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 
U.S. 1, 8–14 (1947); id. at 31-43 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (“No provision of the 
Constitution is more closely tied to or given content by its generating history 
than the religion clause of the First Amendment.”). 
292. Christopher C. Lund, The Congressional Chaplaincies, 17 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 1171, 1210 (2009). 
293. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
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religious symbols.294  Undeterred, Burger relied on what he 
described as “an unbroken history of official acknowledgement[s] 
. . . of the role of religion in American life.”295  That history was 
“replete with official references to the value and invocation of 
Divine guidance in deliberations and pronouncements of the 
Founding Fathers and contemporary leaders.”296  Burger then 
provided a laundry list of official declarations, proclamations, and 
events: Thanksgiving proclamations, declarations of a National 
Day of Prayer, the adoption of the national motto, and the insertion 
of “One nation under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance.297  In no 
place did Burger discuss the context behind the acts or what 
political reasons may have motivated public officials to employ 
religious rhetoric.298  These declarations were simply part of the 
“traditions” and “heritage” that underlay the nation’s founding.299  
This “history,” Burger declared, “reveals . . . the contemporaneous 
understanding of the guarantees” of the religion clauses.300  
Burger’s second foray into a Christian nation narrative drew the ire 
of Justice Brennan, who in a dissent remarked that “[b]y insisting 
that such a distinctively sectarian message is merely an 
unobjectionable part of our ‘religious heritage,’ the Court takes a 
long step backwards to the days when Justice Brewer could 
arrogantly declare of the Court that ‘this is a Christian nation.’”301 
Arguments that the nation’s religious heritage and traditions, 
revealed through official declarations concerning religion, should 
control the outcome in church-state controversies surfaced in later 
cases.  In County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Justice Kennedy criticized 
the majority’s use of a “no-religious endorsement” standard to 
294. See id. at 672-78.  According to Justice Kennedy, “displays commemo-
rating religious holidays were not commonplace in 1791.”  County of Allegheny 
v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 669 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part).
295. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673–74.
296. Id. at 675.
297. Id. at 675–77.
298. See id.
299. Id. at 677-78.
300. Id. at 677.
301. Id. at 717–18 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Church of the Holy
Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892)) (internal citation omitted). 
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strike the display of a creche inside a county courthouse.302  Such 
an approach, Kennedy argued, “would invalidate longstanding 
traditions” of public acknowledgements of Christianity, and 
Kennedy supported his position by referencing not only the familiar 
litany of Thanksgiving proclamations and National Day of Prayer 
declarations but also the mythological claim of George Washington 
kneeling in prayer at Valley Forge.303  The “meaning of the 
[Establishment] Clause is to be determined by reference to 
historical practices and understandings,” apparently informed by 
the Christian nation narrative.304  Similarly, in Lee v. Weisman, 
which struck down the practice of prayers at public school 
graduation ceremonies, Justice Scalia argued in his dissent for 
allowing the prayers based on events such as the Declaration of 
Independence’s invocation of “divine Providence” and George 
Washington’s first inaugural address and first Thanksgiving 
Proclamation with their acknowledgements of the nation’s 
dependence on the “Great Lord and Rules of Nations.”305  Although 
these various references could be dismissed as merely reflections of 
a civil religion, they still rely on a particular interpretation of 
history that emphasizes the allegedly religious influences on the 
nation’s founding, influences that should control church-state 
adjudication today. 
That a narrative about the purported religious influences on 
the founding began appearing in Court decisions after 1980 was not 
by happenstance.  County of Allegheny marked the beginning of 
what would become a growing cottage industry that continues to 
this day: the filing of amicus curiae briefs by Religious Right 
advocacy groups.  Two Religious Right groups filed briefs in 
Alleghany—Concerned Women for America and National Legal 
Foundation—with both alleging there was a close relationship 
302. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 669–75 (1989) (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
303. Id. at 671–72.  There is no evidence to support the claim of Washington
kneeling in prayer at Valley Forge.  See Paul Boller, GEORGE WASHINGTON AND 
RELIGION 10 (1963). 
304. See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 670 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). 
305. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 633–35, 645 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing). 
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between Christianity and the nation’s founding.306  As the former’s 
brief asserted:  
Religion, by virtue of history and tradition, was so 
enmeshed in American culture that the Establishment 
Clause could not, even if that were the desired result, 
entirely sever government from religion. . . .  
. . . . 
 Both before and after the drafting and enactment of the 
First Amendment, governmental acknowledgment of a 
Supreme Being was a naturally accepted feature of 
American public life.  The Framers of the Constitution and 
government officials invoked the name of God, asked his 
blessings upon our Nation, and encouraged our people to 
do the same.307 
The practice of filing amicus briefs grew steadily through the 
1990s as more Religious Right organizations entered the picture: 
the American Center for Law and Justice; the Rutherford Institute; 
Liberty Council; the Alliance Defense Fund (now, Alliance 
Defending Freedom); and the Christian Legal Society, among 
others.  The legal disputes the Court heard during that decade did 
not lend themselves to arguments about the nation’s religious 
founding.  In the new century, however, the Court heard several 
cases that invited arguments about the nation’s purported religious 
founding.  In Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, the 
justices considered the contentious issue of removing the words 
“under God” from the Pledge of Allegiance.308  The case elicited a 
plethora of amicus briefs that argued the phrase was consistent 
with, if not mandated by, the nation’s religious heritage.309  The 
nation’s “founding documents acknowledge God,” asserted the brief 
of Liberty Counsel and Wallbuilders (the organization of Christian 
nationalist David Barton), which was chocked full of religious 
306. Brief for Concerned Women for America as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (No. 87-2050), 
1988 WL 1026116, at *4 [hereinafter Brief for Concerned Women for America]; 
Brief for National Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573 (No. 87-2050), 1988 WL 1026118, at *2–*9. 
307. Brief for Concerned Women for America, supra note 306, at *4, *9.
308. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 5 (2004).
309. Id. at 3–5.
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statements by presidents and other political figures.310  “[W]ithout 
our belief in God, there is no foundation for our belief in the 
inalienable rights given by God.”311  Other amicus briefs made 
similar claims.312  “We cannot read the history of our rise and 
development as a nation, without reckoning with the place the Bible 
has occupied in shaping the advances of the Republic,” asserted the 
Institute in Basic Life Principles.313  “Thus it establishes a 
philosophy that God is a ruler and that His transendent [sic] laws 
are to govern and be the guide for, and superior, to man’s laws. 
That does not establish a religion, but the legal philosophy of 
government of these United States.”314  Those amici were cheated 
out of a hoped-for confirmation from the Court that the nation 
existed “under God” when the majority side-stepped the issue, 
holding that the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the recitation 
of the Pledge.315 
310. Brief of Liberty Counsel et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (No. 02-1624), 2003 
WL 23051982, at *6–*8. 
311. Id. at *2.
312. See, e.g., Brief of the Knights of Columbus as Amicus Curiae Support-
ing Petitioners, Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (No. 02-1624), 2003 WL 23011469, at *2–
*4 (“Our government is founded on the concept of the individuality and the
dignity of the human being.  Underlying this concept is the belief that the hu-
man person is important because he was created by God and endowed by Him
with certain inalienable rights which no civil authority may usurp.”); Brief of
the Rutherford Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Newdow,
542 U.S. 1 (No. 02-1624), 2003 WL 23010742, at *10 (“From the earliest days
of colonization to the inception and expansion of the American Republic, our
nation’s government has never been symbolically neutral with regard to the
existence and providence of God.”); Brief of Pacific Justice Institute as Amicus
Curiae Supporting of Petitioners, Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (No. 02-1624), 2003 WL
23002712, at *2 (The phrase “‘under God’ in the pledge . . . is merely a restate-
ment of the political philosophy underpinning this nation’s form of govern-
ment.”).
313. Brief of the Institute in Basic Life Principles et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (No. 02-1624), 2003 WL 23112949, 
at *12.  
314. Id at *9.
315. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 16–18.  In his concurring opinion urging the
Court to rule on the merits, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote: 
To the millions of people who regularly recite the Pledge, and who 
have no access to, or concern with, such legislation or legislative his-
tory, “under God” might mean several different things: that God has 
guided the destiny of the United States, for example, or that the 
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Christian nation proponents had an opportunity to press their 
claims before the Court the following year when the justices heard 
two cases involving the display of the Ten Commandments on 
public property: Van Orden v. Perry and McCreary County v. 
ACLU.316  In those two cases, the justices issued seemingly 
contradictory rulings, upholding a Ten Commandments monument 
on the Texas Capitol grounds in Van Orden while striking Ten 
Commandments plaques hung in Kentucky county courthouses in 
McCreary County.317  The issue of the nation’s Christian heritage 
was front and center as the Kentucky displays were justified on the 
ground that the “Ten Commandments have profoundly influenced 
the formation of Western legal thought and the formation of our 
country. . . . The Ten Commandments provide the moral 
background of the Declaration of Independence and the foundation 
of our legal tradition.”318  Again, an onslaught of amicus briefs 
raised Christian nation claims.319  “Our laws, our form of 
government, and our political history are not understandable 
without reference to the biblical ethical monotheism,” asserted the 
amicus brief for the Family Research Council, an organization 
United States exists under God’s authority.  How much consideration 
anyone gives to the phrase probably varies, since the Pledge itself is a 
patriotic observance focused primarily on the flag and the Nation, and 
only secondarily on the description of the Nation.  The phrase “under 
God” in the Pledge seems, as a historical matter, to sum up the atti-
tude of the Nation’s leaders, and to manifest itself in many of our pub-
lic observances. 
Id. at 26 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment). 
316. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005) (plurality opinion);
McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 850 (2005).  Justice Breyer was the 
deciding fifth vote in both Van Orden and McCreary County, with the other 
eight justices voting consistently to allow or disallow the displays.  Van Orden, 
545 U.S. at 679; McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 848. 
317. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681; McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 850.
318. McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 856 (quoting Appendix to Petition for
Certiorari at 189a, McCreary County, 545 U.S. 844 (No. 03-1693)). 
319. See, e.g., Brief of the Family Research Council, Inc. & Focus on the
Family as Amici Curiae Supporting the Petitioners, McCreary County v. 
ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (No. 03-1693) [hereinafter Brief of the Family Re-
search Council, Inc. and Focus on the Family]; Brief of the National Legal 
Foundation as Amicus Curiae, ACLU v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438 (6th 
Cir. 2003) (No. 01-5935) [hereinafter Brief of the National Legal Foundation]. 
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founded by Religious Right leader James Dobson.320  Likewise, the 
National Legal Foundation declared that “authoritative voices 
establish that the Ten Commandments impacted law and 
jurisprudence in America.”321  
In his plurality opinion upholding the Ten Commandment 
monument in Van Orden, Chief Justice Rehnquist borrowed 
evidence from the amicus briefs, though he stopped short of 
embracing their conclusions.322  Quoting from Lynch, Rehnquist 
reaffirmed the “unbroken history of official acknowledgement . . . of 
the role of religion in American life,” then, going a step further to 
specify that that included, “[r]ecognition of the role of God in our 
Nation’s heritage,” as well.323  After citing to Washington’s 
Thanksgiving Proclamation for that general proposition, he segued 
to more recent “acknowledgements of the role played by the Ten 
Commandments in our Nation’s heritage.”324  Missing from that 
discussion was any citation to official acknowledgements or use of 
the Ten Commandments coincident to the founding, in part because 
such historical evidence is lacking.325  As Christian nationalists are 
apt to do, however, Rehnquist was happy to draw from generalities 
to reach a specific conclusion. 
In contrast to the Van Orden plurality, Justice Scalia’s 
dissenting opinion in McCreary openly embraced the Christian- 
nation narrative.326  “Those who wrote the Constitution believed 
that morality was essential to the well-being of society and that 
encouragement of religion was the best way to foster morality,” 
Scalia wrote.327  Based on the historical record of religious 
320. Brief of the Family Research Council, Inc. & Focus on the Family, su-
pra note 319, at 14. 
321. Brief of the National Legal Foundation, supra note 319, at 2.
322. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. 686–89 (plurality opinion).
323. Id. at 686–87 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674 (1984)).
324. Id. at 689.  Rehnquist noted that “President Washington’s [Thanksgiv-
ing] proclamation directly attributed to the Supreme Being the foundations 
and successes of our young Nation.”  Id. at 686–87. 
325. See Brief of Legal Historians & Law Scholars as Amici Curiae Support-
ing Respondents at 6–26, McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (No. 
01-5939) [hereinafter Brief of Legal Historians]; see generally Steven K. Green,
The Fount of Everything Just and Right? The Ten Commandments as a Source
of American Law, 14 J. L. & REL. 525 (1999).
326. See McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 887, 893 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
327. Id. at 887.
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declarations and proclamations, Scalia asserted, the Constitution 
did not require government neutrality toward religion but it could 
favor the prevailing religion of the people: “With respect to public 
acknowledgement of religious belief, it is entirely clear from our 
Nation’s historical practices that the Establishment Clause permits 
this disregard of polytheists and believers in unconcerned deities, 
just as it permits the disregard of devout atheists.”328  With that 
language, Justice Scalia indicated how a Christian nation 
perspective might be applied in law. 
For nine years following the Ten Commandments cases, the 
Court’s church-state docket provided little opportunity for applying 
a Christian nation approach.  In 2014, however, the justices 
revisited the issue of prayers in legislative forums in Town of Greece 
v. Galloway.329  That issue again invited arguments based on the
perceived religious practices of the Founders and of their purported
intent for government to foster religion.330  The town and several of
its supporting amici argued for the constitutionality of public
invocations based on Marsh and the historical legacy of such
practices.331  Other supporting amici, however, raised broader
claims, with one citing George Washington’s First Thanksgiving
Proclamation for the proposition that “[i]t is the duty of all nations
to acknowledge the providence of the Almighty God.”332  The
Declaration of Independence was crafted “in prayer and Bible
study,” claimed another amici.333  “The institutions of our society
are founded on the belief that there is an authority higher than the
authority of the State; That There Is a Moral Law Which the State
328. Id. at 893.
329. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 569-570 (2014).
330. See id. at 576–77.
331. Brief for Petitioner at 12, Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (No. 12-696); Brief
for the State of South Carolina as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 13-
14, Town of Greece, 572 U.S. 565 (No. 12-696); Brief for the United States as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 2, Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (No. 12-696). 
332. Brief of Foundation for Moral Law as of Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 19, Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (No. 12-696) (quoting McCreary 
County, 545 U.S. at 887 (Scalia, J., dissenting)); see also Brief of WallBuilders, 
Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Petitioner and supporting reversal at 
13–23, Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (No. 12-696). 
333. Motion for Leave to File Brief out of Time and Brief of The Faith &
Action Networks as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Petitioner at 2, Galloway, 
572 U.S. 565 (No. 12-696). 
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Is Powerless to Alter; That the Individual Possesses Rights, 
Conferred by the Creator or, Which Government Must Respect.”334  
Once again, the Court’s opinion upholding the practice steered clear 
of any express Christian nation rationalization: “[a]s practiced by 
Congress since the framing of the Constitution,” wrote Justice 
Kennedy, “legislative prayer lends gravity to public business, 
reminds lawmakers to transcend petty differences in pursuit of a 
higher purpose, and expresses a common aspiration to a just and 
peaceful society.”335  Yet Justice Kennedy opened the door to the 
Court’s greater use of history in ways that might be determinative. 
Rather than Marsh representing an exception to the Establishment 
Clause, Kennedy remarked, “the Establishment Clause must be 
interpreted ‘by reference to historical practices and 
understandings.’”336  “Any test the Court adopts must acknowledge 
a practice that was accepted by the Framers and has withstood the 
critical scrutiny of time and political change.”337  In so stating, 
Kennedy provided no guidance as to what counts as an “accepted” 
historical practice or how courts are to determine the relevance of 
one practice over another.338  Even Justice Thomas acknowledged 
that “the relationship between church and state in the fledgling 
Republic was far from settled at the time of ratification.”339  Yet 
Thomas’s colleagues believed that some consensus understanding 
could be divined; as Justice Alito declared in his concurring opinion 
(with Justice Scalia) that cited the same historical confluence as 
was highlighted in Marsh: 
 This Court has often noted that actions taken by the 
First Congress are presumptively consistent with the Bill 
of Rights, and this principle has special force when it comes 
to the interpretation of the Establishment Clause.  This 
Court has always purported to base its Establishment 
334. Id. at 5–6.
335. Galloway, 572 U.S. at 575.
336. Id. at 576 (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 670
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
337. Id. at 577 (citing County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 670 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
338. See id. at 575–78.
339. Id. at 606 (Thomas, J., concurring in part).
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Clause decisions on the original meaning of that 
provision. . . .  
 There can be little doubt that the decision 
in Marsh reflected the original understanding of the First 
Amendment.340   
Unfortunately, neither Justice Breyer’s nor Justice Kagan’s 
dissenting opinions challenged the majority’s reliance on history or, 
except in a passing footnote, its historical interpretation of the 
practice of legislative prayers.341   
Town of Greece, like Marsh before it, was, in many ways, an 
easy decision because of the clear example of legislative chaplains 
and public prayer concurrent to the founding.342  That clarity 
becomes more oblique when an exact historical pedigree is missing. 
This is where Christian nation arguments become more troubling 
and misleading because they invite the Court to rule by analogy—
does President Washington’s issuance of a Thanksgiving 
proclamation also validate a government-owned religious 
symbol?343  This was the situation in 2019 with the case of 
American Legion v. American Humanist Association, a challenge to 
a thirty-two foot Latin cross monument erected on government 
property alongside a prominent thoroughfare.344  The cross had 
stood at its location since 1925 as a tribute to local soldiers who had 
died in World War I.345  But the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
had held the cross represented an unconstitutional endorsement of 
340. Id. at 602 (Alito, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
341. See id. at 610 (Breyer, J., dissenting); See id. at 615 (Kagan, J., dis-
senting).  In her brief challenge to the majority’s interpretation of the historical 
record, Justice Kagan argued that official prayers during the founding period 
were overwhelmingly inclusive in nature and couched in nonsectarian lan-
guage, a record that would not support the practice in Greece.  Id. at 619 n.1. 
342. See id. at 576 (majority opinion).
343. Cf. Alex J. Luchenister & Sarah R. Goetz, A Hollow History Test: Why
Establishment Clause Cases Should Not Be Decided through Comparisons with 
Historical Practices, 68 CATH. U.L. REV. 653, 679–80 (2019) (“Even if [presiden-
tial prayer proclamations] are . . . consistent with the intent of the First 
Amendment, they shed little light on how to decide church state controversies 
in other matters. . . .  The Thanksgiving proclamations issued by early presi-
dents were nonsectarian, ecumenical, isolated written statements that were 
not presented in coercive environments.”). 
344. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2077–78 (2019).
345. Id. at 2074.
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Christianity,346 which triggered an alarm among religious 
conservatives who again flooded the Court with amicus briefs 
arguing for constitutionality based on historical practices and 
traditions.347  Again, claims of the nation’s Christian foundations 
and the piety of the nation’s Founders figured prominently in many 
amicus briefs supporting the cross.  “From the Republic’s inception 
its Founders embraced governmental expressions of religious belief, 
unabashedly intertwining the secular and religious,” argued a 
group of professors from conservative Christian colleges.348  The 
Founders engaged in religious expression, the Billy Graham 
Evangelistic Crusade asserted, because they “understood that 
religious beliefs and ethical principles provided a foundation for, 
and helped the preservation of, the type of government that they 
had set up in the Constitution.”349  No brief went as far as the one 
by the Foundation for Moral Law, however, which boldly asserted 
that “all valid human law must rest upon the Revealed Law, which 
is ‘to be found only in the Holy Scriptures,’ and on the Law of 
Nature, ‘which is expressly declared so to be by God himself.’”350  
The brief then cited favorably from the 1811 Ruggles blasphemy 
decision for the proposition that “whatever strikes at the root of 
Christianity, tends manifestly to the dissolution of civil 
government.”351  Leaving little to doubt about its position, the brief 
concluded by asserting that “we constantly speak of this republic as 
a Christian nation¾in fact, as the leading Christian nation of the 
346. Id. at 2079.
347. See, e.g., Brief of Citizens United et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019) (No. 17-
1717) [hereinafter Brief of Citizens United et al.]; Brief of the Foundation for 
Moral Law as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. 
2067 (No. 17-1717) [hereinafter Brief of the Foundation for Moral Law]; Brief 
of Various Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting the Petitioners, Am. Legion, 
139 S. Ct. 2067 (No. 17-1717, 18-18) [hereinafter Brief of Various Professors]; 
Brief of Veterans in Defense of Liberty et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners and urging reversal, Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (No. 17-1717, 18-
18) [hereinafter Brief of Veterans in Defense of Liberty et al.].
348. Brief of Various Professors, supra note 347, at 8; see also Brief of
Citizens United et al., supra note 347, at 21–25. 
349. Brief of Veterans in Defense of Liberty et al., supra note 347, at 11.
350. Brief of the Foundation for Moral Law, supra note 347, at 19-20
(quoting 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 41–
42 (Robert Bell 1772) (1765-69)). 
351. Id. at 20 (quoting People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290 (N.Y. 1811)).
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world.  The popular use of the term certainly has significance.”352  
The connection between such “historical” arguments and the 
Christian nation maxim was finally in the open.353 
Unlike in Marsh and Town of Greece with the founding era 
example of chaplains, the Court in American Legion lacked any 
direct example of government-sponsored religious symbols at the 
time of the founding—the closest examples provided in the briefing 
were privately erected crosses and crosses found in government 
cemeteries.354  Undeterred, Justice Alito declared that the Court’s 
approach in such disputes was one that “looks to history for 
guidance.”355  The void of historical evidence, though, forced Justice 
Alito to analogize to other practices and declarations.356  Alito 
offered a laundry list, referencing Washington’s Thanksgiving 
Proclamation and his Farewell Address (perennial favorites), 
legislative chaplaincies, and even American cities with religious 
names (e.g., San Diego, Los Angeles) to demonstrate a tradition of 
official use of religious language and of government recognition of 
religion generally.357  This allowed Alito to blithely conclude that 
“[w]here categories of monuments, symbols, and practices with a 
longstanding history follow in that tradition, they are likewise 
constitutional.”358 
This expansive view of relevant history and traditions has 
relieved the justices from relying on more robust Christian nation 
arguments.  Still, there can be no denying that such arguments 
have been in the background of religious symbolism cases as the 
dissenting opinions in Van Orden and McCreary County 
acknowledged.359  The constant barrage of amicus briefs raising 
claims of the nation’s religious heritage and of the religious beliefs 
352. Id. at 28 (citing DAVID J. BREWER, THE UNITED STATES A CHRISTIAN
NATION 12 (1905)). 
353. Id. at 19–20, 28.
354. Brief of Various Professors, supra note 347, at 3, 16-19.
355. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2087 (2019) (plu-
rality opinion). 
356. See id. at 2087–89.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 2089.
359. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 895–900 (2005) (Scalia,
J., dissenting); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 722–35 (2005) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (criticizing arguments that raise a “Christian nation” rationale). 
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of the Founders, purportedly demonstrated by their occasional use 
of religious rhetoric, has no doubt had a subtle effect on those judges 
who are already predisposed to such arguments and are otherwise 
hostile to the previous legal regime of church-state separation.  The 
emboldened Christian nation arguments have helped to install a 
jurisprudence of “Christian nation light.” 
V. BAD HISTORY360
For decades, legal historians have scrutinized and criticized 
the use of history by lawyers and courts.361  The term “law office 
history” has become synonymous for the use of history in 
adversarial legal proceedings where lawyers and judges rely on 
incomplete historical accounts to reach a particular legal 
outcome.362  Instead of approaching the historical record 
dispassionately and with a critical eye as professional historians 
are trained to do, history for lawyers and judges is merely another 
form of evidence or argumentation to support a desired legal 
result.363  As Charles Miller once related sarcastically: “[f]or 
certainty in the law a little bad history is not too high a price to 
pay.”364 
One particularly pernicious form of law office history is 
originalism.  As promoted by the late-Justice Scalia and Justice 
Thomas, originalism searches for the “original meaning” or 
“understanding” of a constitutional principle or provision and then 
360. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 485 U.S. 38, 107 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing) (criticizing Jefferson’s “wall of separation” metaphor as “based on bad his-
tory”). 
361. E.g., CHARLES A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF 
HISTORY 25 (1969); Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Living Hand of the Past: 
History and Constitutional Justice, 65 FORD. L. REV. 1611, 1611–12 (1997); 
Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 523, 526 (1995); Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History—And 
Through It, 65 FORD. L. REV. 1627, 1627-29 (1997); Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity 
Through History (Or To It), 65 FORD. L. REV. 1587, 1587–88 (1997). 
362. Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. 
CT. REV. 119 passim (1997). 
363. DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, HISTORIANS’ FALLACIES: TOWARD A LOGIC OF
HISTORICAL THOUGHT passim (1970); see Steven K. Green, “Bad History”: The 
Lure of History in Establishment Clause Adjudication, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1717, 1732–33 (2006). 
364. MILLER, supra note 361, at 194 (quoting WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, ESSAYS 
IN LAW AND HISTORY 24 (1946)). 
2021] IS THIS A CHRISTIAN NATION? 487 
promises to apply that meaning with fealty to a current 
constitutional conflict.365  For religion clause purposes, therefore, 
an originalist would attempt to divine the original understanding 
of free exercise and non-establishment and then apply that 
understanding with rigor to determine the outcome of a dispute.  As 
Scalia asserted in his McCreary dissent, after documenting public 
religious affirmations during the founding period, the 
Establishment Clause “was enshrined in the Constitution’s text, 
and these official actions show what it meant. . . .  What is more 
probative of the meaning of the Establishment Clause than the 
actions of the very Congress that proposed it, and of the first 
President charged with observing it?”366  Justice Thomas made an 
even more explicit call for a “return to the original meaning” of the 
Establishment Clause in his Van Orden concurrence, writing that: 
[O]ur task would be far simpler if we returned to the
original meaning of the word “establishment” than it is
under the various approaches this Court now uses.  The
Framers understood an establishment “necessarily to
involve actual legal coercion.” . . .
There is no question that, based on the original meaning of 
the Establishment Clause, the Ten Commandments 
display at issue here is constitutional.367 
The lure of history for constitutional adjudication is 
irresistible.  History legitimizes legal arguments and judicial 
decision-making by offering an aura of authority and objectivity.368  
History purportedly serves as an external constraint on judicial 
365. See generally Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Orig-
inal Intent? 5 CONST. COMMENT. 77 (1988); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original 
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 887 (1985); H. Jeffer-
son Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA.  L. REV. 659, 661 (1987) [hereinafter 
Rules for Originalists]; Jack N. Rakove, The Original Intention of Original Un-
derstanding, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 159 (1996). 
366. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 896–97 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
367. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 693–94 (2005) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) (quoting Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 52 (2004) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in judgment)). 
368. MARK DE WOLF HOWE, GARDEN AND WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND 
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 167-68 (1967); Rules for 
Originalists, supra note 365, at 660–61; Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The 
Lesser Evil, 57 CINN. L. REV. 849, 854 (1989). 
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subjectivity by providing an independent and non-ideological 
source of information from which all parties can draw and upon 
which all people can agree.  As Dean Erwin Chemerinsky has 
observed, judges “want very much to make it appear that their 
decisions are not based on their personal opinions, but instead are 
derived from an external source.”369   
This notion that there is an objective, consensus, and pellucid 
interpretation of any historical event is ridiculous.  Historians are 
committed to objectivity, but they understand—in a manner that is 
apparently incongruous to some jurists—that history is not 
objective.  Any exploration into history is selective, and all good 
accounts of history are interpretive.370  The difference is that 
historians recognize the selective and interpretive aspect to their 
craft while jurists act as if such “shortcomings” are inconsistent 
with a historical analysis instead of being part of the 
undertaking.371  Historians also avoid efforts to identify “historical 
truths.”  Rather than mining pages of historical information to 
uncover “truths,” historians seek explanation and illumination; the 
study of history is not to provide “answers” to modern questions but 
to provide understanding of our past in the hope it may inform the 
present.372  In contrast, lawyers primarily approach history as 
advocates seeking authority for the propositions they hope to 
prove.373   
The final fallacy of law office history (and originalism in 
particular) is the failure to recognize the indeterminacy and 
incompleteness of the historical record.  We have only those 
documents that have survived the ravages of time and have been 
369. Erwin Chemerinsky, History, Tradition, the Supreme Court, and the
First Amendment, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 901, 908 (1993). 
370. R.G. COLLINGWOOD, THE IDEA OF HISTORY 218–19 (1964); FISCHER, su-
pra note 363, at 4–5, 64–65. 
371. Rules for Originalists, supra note 365, at 660–61 (“Historical judg-
ments . . . necessarily involve elements of creativity and interpretative 
choice.”). 
372. FISCHER, supra note 363, at 40 (“It is no easy matter to tell the truth,
pure and simple, about past events; for historical truths are never pure, and 
rarely simple.”). 
373. Cass R. Sunstein, The Idea of a Useable Past, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 601, 
602 (1995). 
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transcribed, compiled, and authenticated.374  No doubt, other 
important, unrecorded discussions about the purpose and meaning 
of the Establishment Clause took place during the House committee 
on style, in the House debates, and in the Senate debate (which was 
not recorded in the Senate Journal), let alone in the near-by 
taverns.375  In addition, the records that do exist may be woefully 
inaccurate, as they were transcribed by people who made mistakes 
and self-edited as they went along (not to mention allegations that 
the transcriber for the Annals of Congress was frequently 
inebriated).376  Madison stated that the accuracy of the reported 
debates of the First Congress was “not to be relied on”: 
The face of the debates shews [sic] that they are defective, 
and desultory, where not revised, or written out by the 
Speakers.  In some instances, he makes them inconsistent 
with themselves, by erroneous reports of their speeches at 
different times on the same subject.  [The reporter] was 
indolent and sometimes filled up blanks in his notes from 
memory or imagination.377 
In addition, remarks contained within documents whose accuracy 
can be presumed can easily be misunderstood.  The framers used 
terms and phrases familiar to the late eighteenth century, and 
frequently employed rhetoric that was intentionally vague, 
duplicitous, or loaded with irony.378  For example, several 
motivations can be read into Benjamin Franklin’s famous call for 
prayer at the Constitutional Convention: personal piety; irony; or 
374. See James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity
of the Documentary Record, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1, 38 (1986). 
375. Douglas Laycock, A Survey of Religious Liberty in the United States,
47 OHIO. ST.  L. REV. 409, 412–13 (1986). 
376. See Hutson, supra note 374, at 36 (discussing the excessive drinking of
the reporter, Thomas Lloyd, and relating that his notes were “frequently gar-
bled and that he neglected to report speeches whose texts are known to exist 
elsewhere”). 
377. Id. at 38 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Edward Everett (Jan.
7, 1832), in Marion Tinling, Thomas Lloyd’s Reports of the First Federal Con-
gress, 18 WM. & MARY Q. 519, 537–38 (1961) (emphasis in original)). 
378. Laycock, supra note 375, at 413-14.
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shaming the delegates into compromise.379  The Framers’ remarks 
and letters also arose within particular contexts that may not be 
apparent from the documents themselves.  Therefore, the precise 
meanings of recorded statements may be ambiguous at best.380   
All of this suggests that history can easily be misunderstood 
and manipulated by modern advocates and jurists.  Those who 
advance a Christian nation or “religious founding” narrative can 
cherry-pick statements and present them as “facts” without having 
to do the hard work of providing context, explanation, and possible 
motivation.  As the author of several amicus briefs that have 
examined historical events, I can attest that court briefs with a 
restricted word count are not the best mediums to explain historical 
complexity and nuance.381  Although codes of legal ethics forbid an 
attorney from lying or concealing evidence, there is little to prevent 
one from presenting highly selective historical data accompanied by 
a skewed interpretation (otherwise known as “advocacy”). 
A prime example of the dangers of relying on history in 
constitutional adjudication is represented in the case that ushered 
in this approach: Marsh v. Chambers.  As noted, Marsh parted from 
the established analytical standard of asking whether a practice 
violated current notions of non-establishment of religion, asking 
instead whether the modern practice of legislative chaplaincies and 
prayers had a historical basis.382  As discussed, Chief Justice 
Burger boldly asserted that the practice of chaplaincies was 
379. See THOMAS S. KIDD, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN: THE RELIGIOUS LIFE OF A
FOUNDING FATHER 228–30 (2017); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: 
THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 194 (2016). 
380. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he historical record is at best ambiguous, and statements can 
readily be found to support either side of the proposition.  The ambiguity of 
history is understandable if we recall the nature of the problems uppermost in 
the thinking of the statesmen who fashioned the religious guarantees; they 
were concerned with far more flagrant intrusions of government into the realm 
of religion than any that our century has witnessed.”). 
381. See, e.g., Brief of Baptist Joint Committee for Religious Liberty et al.
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Espinoza v. Mont. Dept. of Reve-
nue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020) (No. 18-1195), 2019 WL 6169967; Brief of Amici 
Curiae, Legal and Religious Historians in Support of Respondent, Trinity Lu-
theran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, 136 S. Ct. 891 (2016) (No. 15-577), 
2016 WL 3667052.  
382. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788–92 (1983); see supra notes 286–
292 and accompanying text. 
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supported by an “unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 
200 years” and that the evidence demonstrated “clearly” that the 
drafters of the First Amendment “did not view paid legislative 
chaplains and opening prayers as a violation of that 
Amendment.”383  Neither of those claims survives a closer 
examination.  In his comprehensive review of legislative chaplains, 
Professor Christopher Lund has remarked that the Court’s “view 
of that history was deeply partial—partial in the sense of being a 
bit slanted as well as partial in the sense of being somewhat 
incomplete.”384  According to Lund, Chief Justice Burger’s 
historical analysis omitted several important details, such as 
contemporary objections to the practice and how later members of 
Congress used chaplaincies to advance sectarian goals.385  
“Marsh’s view of legislative prayer, ultimately, is a somewhat 
idealized and romanticized one,” Lund notes.386  This slanted 
history “perpetuates the very false illusion that the chaplaincies 
were altogether innocuous and universally supported; it ignores all 
the ways in which the chaplaincies were sometimes controversial 
and divisive.  In the end, the Court’s desire to portray the 
chaplaincies as benign ends up distorting its historical analysis.”387 
The same can be said for the majority opinion in Van Orden 
and the dissenting opinions in McCreary County.  As discussed 
above, several amici argued the displays were permissible based on 
acknowledgments of religion during the founding period while 
claiming that the Ten Commandments were a central source for the 
nation’s political and legal principles.388  These assertions no doubt 
impacted the justices’ views about the legal pedigree of the 
Commandments.389 Justice Scalia commended the Ten 
383. Id. at 788, 792; see supra notes 293-301 and accompanying text.
384. Lund, supra note 292, at 1211.
385. Id at 1211-12.
386. Id. at 1173, 1211.
387. Id. at 1213.
388. See supra notes 318–21 and accompanying text.
389. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 687 (“Recognition of the role of
God in our Nation’s heritage has also been reflected in our decisions.  We have 
acknowledged, for example, that ‘religion has been closely identified with our 
history and government.’” (quoting Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 
203, 237 (1963))); Id. at 688 (“[A]cknowledgements of the role played by the 
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Commandments’ “unique contribution to the development of the 
legal system” and asserted that their frequent display “testifies to 
the popular understanding that the Ten Commandments are a 
foundation of the rule of the law, and a symbol of the role that 
religion plays, and continues to play, in our system of 
government.”390  Even Justice Souter stated in his majority opinion 
in McCreary that he did not “deny that the Commandments have 
had influence on civil or secular law.”391  Justices Scalia and Souter 
are not alone, as the idea that the Commandments, as a legal code, 
directly impacted the development of Western law (and American 
law in particular) is widely shared.392  Yet, widely-held perceptions 
can be wrong, particularly when they are based on anecdotes. 
Professor Paul Finkelman and I have separately examined the 
historical record, and we found no evidence that jurists and political 
leaders contemporaneous to the founding claimed that the Ten 
Commandments were a basis for American law or republican 
government.393 To be sure, passing allusions to the 
Commandments or Decalogue appear in contemporary sermons 
(unsurprisingly) and in a smattering of statements by political 
leaders,394 but as best can be determined, no person or persons of 
influence asserted that the Commandments served as the 
Ten Commandments in our Nation’s heritage are common throughout Amer-
ica.”). 
390. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 905, 907 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing). 
391. Id. at 869 (majority opinion).
392. Former federal judge, John T. Noonan, who wrote extensively about
church-state matters, asserted that the Ten Commandments are “the most in-
fluential law code in history.”  JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE BELIEVERS AND THE 
POWERS THAT ARE 4 (1987).  While former law professor Harold Berman de-
clared that until recently, “if one had asked Americans where our Constitu-
tion¾or, indeed, our whole concept of law¾came from, on what it was ulti-
mately based, the overwhelming majority of them would have said, ‘the Ten 
Commandments’ or ‘the Bible.’”  Harold J. Berman, Religion and Law: The 
First Amendment in Historical Perspective 35 EMORY L.J. 777, 788–89 (1986). 
393. Paul Finkelman, The Ten Commandments on the Courthouse Lawn
and Elsewhere 73 FORD. L. REV. 1477, 1518–20 (2005); Green, supra note 325, 
at 558. 
394. In his book, Christian nationalist William J. Federer lists only a hand-
ful of statements by members of the founding generation praising the Ten 
Commandments and he wrongly equates references to natural or higher law 
with the Decalogue.  Contra WILLIAM J. FEDERER, THE TEN COMMANDMENTS
AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON AMERICAN LAW, 17–38 (2003). 
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foundation of American law or government, and there certainly was 
no consensus about that point.395  Significantly, the debates of the 
Constitutional Convention contained in Madison’s Notes are devoid 
of any claims of the authority of the Ten Commandments or the 
Bible generally.396  “In the wide-ranging debates—reprinted in 
Madison’s Notes, the Annals of Congress, Farrand’s Records, 
Elliot’s Debates, and elsewhere—the Founders mentioned Roman 
law, European Continental law, British law, and various other legal 
systems, but as can best be determined, no delegate ever mentioned 
the Ten Commandments or the Bible.”397  Similarly, neither the 
“Bible” nor “Scripture” nor the “Ten Commandments” appears in 
the index of the Federalist Papers, which are generally considered 
to contain the most important discussions of the meaning of the 
United States Constitution at the time of ratification.398  The claim 
that the “Ten Commandments have profoundly influenced the 
formation of Western legal thought and the formation of our 
country” is not supported by history and is a legal fiction.399 
These two examples demonstrate the danger of relying on 
history to any significant degree to resolve a modern constitutional 
dispute.  As Justice Brennan observed several decades ago: 
[T]he  historical record is at best ambiguous, and
statements can readily be found to support either side of
the proposition. The ambiguity of history is
understandable if we recall the nature of the problems
uppermost in the thinking of the statesmen who fashioned
the religious guarantees; they were concerned with far
more flagrant intrusions of government into the realm of
religion than any that our century has witnessed.400
395. Green, supra note 325, at 543–48.  In fact, in State v. Chandler, 2 Del.
553, 557 (1837), the court expressly disclaimed that the common law had ever 
adopted “the laws of God as revealed in the old testament.” 
396. See JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 
OF 1787 (2d ed. 1984). 
397. Brief of Legal Historians, supra note 325, at 13–22.
398. See generally ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON & JOHN JAY, THE
FEDERALIST PAPERS (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
399. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 856, 879–81 (2005).
400. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring). 
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In addition to the indeterminacy of the historical record and its 
questionable relevance to modern conflicts, historical analysis 
lends itself to cherry-picking data.  We should follow the wise words 
of Justice Brennan that “[a] too literal quest for the advice of the 
Founding Fathers upon the issues of these cases seems . . . futile 
and misdirected.”401 
CONCLUSION 
There is little danger—or at least one would hope¾that a 
Supreme Court justice or appellate court judge would today make 
a direct affirmation about America being a Christian nation in 
either a legal or political sense as Justice Brewer did in 1892.402  
Brewer’s declaration was criticized at the time403 and, as discussed, 
has subsequently been repudiated by members of the Supreme 
Court, including Justice Scalia.404  But the fact that Christian- 
nationalist ideas and rhetoric are being pushed by advocates and 
have influenced the Court’s decision making in subtle ways is more 
troubling than a boldfaced declaration like that of Justice Brewer, 
which at least had the advantage of transparency.  Because of the 
indeterminacy of the idea of the nation’s Christian founding, and 
its visceral appeal to many people, a jurisprudence promoting a 
narrative of “Christian nation light” may be more damaging to the 
integrity of the idea of separation of church and state.  For this 
reason, people should not dismiss Christian nation rhetoric as 
harmless to the Constitution’s religion clauses. 
401. Id.
402. See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471
(1892). 
403. Green, supra note 208, at 427–28.
404. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 717–18 (1984) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting); supra notes 
236–37 and accompanying text. 
